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FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
ON THE ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF STATE ABORTION
STATUTES
Roy LUCAS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, mishandled criminal abortions' claimed the lives
of an estimated ten thousand2 American women each year. The
vast majority of these individuals were married-wives and mothers.3
Legal hospital abortions,4 on the other hand, presently account for
the termination of only eight to nine thousand pregnancies yearly.5
This figure contrasts sharply with the probable one-quarter to two
million annual illegal abortions performed within the United States.'
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law.
'The term "abortion" in this Article means acts taken by a physician or
other person to terminate a woman's pregnancy in its early stages, at least
before the embryonic movement after fourteen or more weeks of pregnancy
("quickening"). When medical advances produce a reliable chemical aborti-
facient which can achieve results identical to those of surgery, the reasoning
of this Article will apply with equal force to state restrictions upon the use
of such a drug.J. BATES & E. ZAWADZKI, CRIMINAL ABORTION 3-4 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as BATES & ZAwADzKI]; L. LADER, ABORTION 3 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as LADER] ; Fisher, Criminal Abortion, 42 J. CRIM. L..C. & P.S. 242
(1951); Leavy & Kummer, Criminal Abortion: A Failure of Law, 50
A.B.A.J. 52 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Leavy & Kummer]. With the
advent of antibiotics, estimates in recent years have been reduced to 500-1000.
Mishandled abortions are the chief cause of maternal death in the United
States today. Niswander, Medical Abortion Practices in the United States,
17 W. REs. L. REv. 403 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Niswander].
'LADER 58-59 states that from 80 to 90 per cent of the American women
who seek to terminate a pregnancy by abortion are married. See also P.
GEBnARD et. al., PREGNANCY, BIRTH & ABORTION 96-99 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as GEBEARD]; F. TAuSSIG, ABORTION: SPONTANEOUS AND INDUCED;
MEDICAL SOCIAL AsPEcTs 28 (1936) [hereinafter cited as TAUSSIG]; THERA-
PEUTIC ABORTION 3, 6 (H. Rosen ed. 1954) [hereinafter cited as Rosen].
' "Therapeutic abortion" is the common term used to designate hospital
abortions for medical indications.
'D. LowE, ABORTION AND THE LAW ix (1966) [hereinafter cited as
LowE]: "only 9,000 women a year succeed in gaining legal permission to
terminate unwanted pregnancies." See also GEBHARD 196-97; LADER 24. On
therapeutic abortion practices in American hospitals see generally Niswan-
der 415-18.
'Although estimates of underground activities are inherently uncertain,
authorities generally use an approximate range of 200,000 to 1,500,000.
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Such persistent flouting by citizens of laws written and enacted in the
last century is the subject of increasing public controversy and dis-
cussion.7 It brings into focus sensitive issues of family planning and
marital autonomy, church-state relations, subjective sexual taboos,
and the mysteries of human procreation, life and death.
To date efforts at promoting or stifling8 abortion reform have
focused on legislative action both in the United States and abroad.
This article, however, examines the possibility of federal constitu-
tional bases for invalidating state abortion restrictions. Part I
summarizes the state of the law and describes the movement for re-
form. Part II arrays the interests at stake in the underlying contro-
versy and places these in a constitutional framework. Part III then
explores the federal constitutional claims which narrow the choices
a court could face in a clear-cut challenge to any existing state abor-
tion statute.
A. The State of the Law9
In the Anglo-American legal sphere, abortion before "quicken-
ing" was no crime under the common law of England. Early United
States cases adopted this view.1" Abortion apparently raised no legal
LADER 2; RosEN 3, 6. Three independent major studies have set the estimate
at 1,000,000. GEBHARD 136-37; TAuSSIG 25; Regine, A Study of Pregnancy
Wastage, 13, MILBANK MEmORiAL FuND QUART. No. 4, at 347-65 (1935).
Actual public demand for legalized abortion is so great that "one out of
every five pregnancies in the United States terminates in illegal abortion."
BATEs & ZAWADSKI 3.1 See note 29, infra, for citation to recent books and periodical literature
on the abortion reform controversy.
' The thrust of abortion reform opposition comes from an insistence that
abortion can be equated with homicide and is therefore inconsistent with the
social and religious value accorded to human life. See, e.g., N. ST. JOHN-
STEvAs, THE RIGHT To LIFE (1964); Byne, Abortion in Perspective, 5 DuQ.
U.L. RFv. 125 (1966); Drinan, The Inviolability of the Right to be Born,
17 W. REs. L. REv. 465 (1965); Huser, The Meaning of "Fetits" in Relation
to the Crime of Abortion, 8 Ju isT 306 (1948); Comment, 37 U. CoLo. L.
REv. 283 (1965).
' See generally George, Current Abortion Laws: Proposals and Move-
ments for Reform, 17 W. Ras. L. REv. 371, 375-90 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as George]; Leavy & Kummer, Aboition and the Population Crisis; Thera-
peutic Abortion and the Law; Some New Approaches, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 647,
653-54 (1966); Sands, The Therapeutic Abortion Act: An Answer to the
Opposition, 13 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 285, 288-90, 310-12 (1966). For the most
recent legislative activity see notes 27-29 infra, and accompanying text.
"
0E.g. Smith v. Gaffard, 31 Ala. 45 (1857) (dictuim); Mitchell v. Com-
monwealth, 78 Ky. 204 (1879) ; Commonwealth v. Bangs, 9 Mass. 387 (1812) ;
State v. Murphy, 27 N.J.L. 112 (1858) (dictum). Few early American
cases decided this question. Those which did disapproved only acts which
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or moral controversy in this country until the post-Civil War period.
During this era, however, a repressive ascetic ethic gave rise to the
present-day framework of abortion legislation."
The later decades of the last century yielded substantial changes
in the initial assumptions underlying abortion statutes. Marital
choice in family planning and timing became a subordinate interest.1 2
Most elevated were the interests of community elders in compelling
uniform adherence to specified moral norms.1" These precepts gen-
erally defined human sexual activity as chiefly procreative in function
and nature. Legal bans on both contraception and all abortion fol-
lowed. A secondary consideration, universally held to be humane in
its aim, was to protect pregnant women from the unskilled abortion-
ist.14 Consistent with the initial goal to render marital relations
procreative, however, law-makers chose to protect the woman by
outlawing virtually all abortion rather than providing for therapeutic
hospital abortion under safe antiseptic conditions. To the extent
that extra-statutory abortion is undeterred, " therefore, the second
aim has failed. An incidental effect of the abolition of legal abortion
before "quickening" was to confer on the tiny developing fetus a
legal status in many ways equivalent to that of human beings who
produced miscarriage after quickening. George 375; But cf. Gleitman v.
Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 37-38 & n.4, 227 A.2d 689, 697 & n.4 (1967) (con-
curring opinion). On the common law view see generally 3 J. STEPHEN,
HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 32, 74 (1883).
11 See G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
152 (1957) [hereinafter cited as WILLIAMS]; Quay, ATsifiable Abortion-
Medical and Legal Foundations (pts. 1&2), 49 GEo. L.J. 173, 395 (1960).
During this period Connecticut enacted a law which prohibited the use
of contraceptive devices. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-32 (1958). Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), held that act to be unconstitutiofial
abridgment of a fundamental constitutional right to "marital privacy."
" On the constitutional aspects of marital choice in family planning as a
fundamental right see Part III.B., infra. See also Leavy & Kummer, supra
note 9, at 672-75; Pilpel, Birth Control and a New Birth of Freedom, 27
OHIO ST. L.J. 679 (1966); cf. generally J. FLETCHER, MORALS AND MEDI-
CINE (1954); Ryan, Humane Abortion Laws and the Health Needs of So-
ciety, 17 W. REs. L. Rxv. 424 (1965).
13 Compare P. DEvLiN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1960), with H.
HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963), and Dworkin, Lord Devlin
and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986 (1966).
1 See, e.g., State v. Murphy, 27 N.J.L. 112, 114 (1858):
The design of the statute was not to prevent the procuring of abor-
tions, so much as to guard the health and life of the mother against
the consequences of such attempts.
" See note 6 supra, and accompanying text.
(Vol. 46
STATE ABORTION STATUTES
had already developed and been born, 6 and superior to that of po-
tential children the parents may have planned for a later date.
The absolute tenor of late 19th century abortion "reform" not
only took from the family and physician legal power to schedule the
arrival of children, but also made no explicit and few implicit pro-
visions for abortion in cases of rape, incest, early adolescent preg-
nancy, terminal cancer, rubella, Rhesus-factor complications, or other
dangers to the woman's health." Four states-Louisiana, Massa-
chusetts, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania--enacted no legislative ex-
ception to the general prohibition against abortion.' The Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court, however, engrafted an exception
"'A recent New Jersey decision took this view, A-..concurring opinion
considered the 1849 New Jersey abortion statute "legislative recognition ....
of the principle that the child as a legal entity begins at conception. .. ."
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 36, 227 A.2d 689, 696 (1967) (opinion
of Francis, J.). To use the expression "human being," however, or "child"
when speaking of a developing fetus would have the dual. effect of distorting
ordinary language use and partially pre-determining any argument over the
value which ought to be accorded the fetus when in conflict with the interests
of the pregnant woman. Physically and developmentally the fetus closely
approximates the unfertilized ovum or a collection of undeveloped growing
cells infinitely more than it does a live infant. Certainly at the time most
abortions could take place no one would confuse a fetus with anything
physically human. This physical and developmental actuality of differences
which brings abortion close to contraception is crucial to the evaluation of
issues in the controversy. Cf. Note, 46 ORE. L. RYv. 211, 218 (1967):
Destruction of a fertilized ovum before implantation is hardly distin-
guishable from the more common contraceptive methods in use today.
"1 Due to lack of enforcement of the new statutes and deference to good
faith medical practice, physicians were generally able to provide therapeutic
hospital abortion for pregnant women whose health might be endangered
by carrying a child to term. Lowe, for example, writes:
During the first few decades of this century, permission for thera-
peutic abortion was granted quite readily when the patient was known
to suffer from any one of a wide variety of physical disorders. At the
time it seemed advisable to induce abortion in almost all cases in which
the patient showed evidence of heart disease, tuberculosis, extreme
hypertension, or diabetes.
LowE 2. More recent medical developments, however, have sharply reduced
the dangers of pregnancy when, accompanied by such disorders. This cir-
cumstance, along with an increased fear of religious pressure and criminal
prosecution, has led to a corresponding reduction in the number of hospital
abortions. See note 5 supra. The burden on an ill woman of bearing and
raising an additional child, however, remains substantially the same.1 LA. REv. STAT. § 14:87 (Supp. 1964); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
272, § 19 (1956); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:87-1 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 4718 (1963). The Louisiana licensing provision, however, does not
penalize a physician who aborts a woman whose life was in peril. LA. REv.
STAT. § 37:1285 (1950). For a discussion of the Pennsylvania law see Trout,
Therapeutic Abortion Laws Need Therapy, 37 TEMP. L.Q. 172, 184-86
(1964).
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on its statute in favor of a physician who relied on a good faith belief
that the woman's life or health was in great peril."0 The New Jersey
Supreme Court agreed that a physician may act to save the life of the
pregnant woman, but that court refused to protect the woman's
health.20 Almost all other states enumerated definite circumstances
which justified legal abortion." Forty-six states22 and the District
of Columbia 2 3 now specifically permit abortion to save the life of a
pregnant woman. New Mexico specifically protects the woman from
19 The belief must coincide "with the average judgment of the doctors
in the community in which he practices." Commonwealth v. Brunelle, 341
Mass. 675, 677, 171 N.E.2d 850, 852 (1961). See also Commonwealth v.
Wheeler, 315 Mass. 394, 53 N.E.2d 4 (1944).
"0 State v. Siciliano, 21 N.J. 249, 121 A.2d 490 (1956) ; State v. Branden-
burg, 137 N.J.L. 124, 58 A.2d 709 (1948). See also Gleitman v. Cosgrove,
49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967). As early as the noted Rex v. Bourne,
[1939] 1 K.B. 687, physicians have argued that the distinction between
ensuring the woman's life and guarding her health is too vague to provide
a useful standard for guidance. See Davies, The Law of Abortion and Neces-
sity, 2 MOD. L. REV. 126, 127 (1938).
21 The New Hampshire and South Carolina abortion statutes on attempted
abortion provide no exception. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 585:12 (1955);
S.C. CODE § 16-82 (1962). But see State v. Steadman, 214 S.C.. 1,8, 51 S.C.2d
91, 93 (1948) (exception found implicit in statutory scheme).
" ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 9 (1958) ; ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.060 (1962) ; Anxz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-211 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-301 (1964); CAL.
PEN. CODE § 274-76 (1955), as amended, Cal. Laws, ch. 327 (June 15, 1967),
effective ninety-one days after adjournment of legislature; CoLo. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 40-2-23, -50 (1963), as amended, ch. 190 [1967] CoLo. Sess. L. 284;
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-29 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 301(1953) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 782.10, 797.01 (1965) ; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-
1101, -1103 (1953); HAWAII REv. LAws §§ 309-3, -4 (1955); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 18-601 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 23-1 (Smith-Hurd 1964);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-105 (1956); IOWA CODE ANN. § 701.1 (1950); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-410 (1964) (This section is a manslaughter provision. No
section specifically covers abortion. See also § 21-409.); Ky. REv. STAT. §
436.020 (1962); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 51 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 3 (1957); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.204 (1962); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 617.18 (1964); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2223 (1957), as anended, Miss. Laws,
ch. 358 (1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.100 (1953); MONT. Rnv. CODES ANN.§ 94-401 (1947); NED. RIv. STAT. §§ 28-404, -405 (1965); NEV. REv. STAT.
§ 201.120 (1963); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 585:13 (1955) (abortion of
quick child); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A-5-1, -3 (1964); N.Y. PEN. LAW §§
80-81 (1951); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 12-25-01 (1960); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.16 (1953); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 861 (1967); OE. REv. STAT. § 163.060 (1964); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 11-3-1 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-82 (1962); S.D. CODE§ 13.3101 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-301 (1955); TEx. PEN CODE ANN.
art. 1191 (1961); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-1 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § -101 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. 18.1-62 (1960); WASH. REV. CODE §
9.02.010 (1956); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5923 (1961); Wis. STAT. § 940.04
(1963); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-77 (1959).
" D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1961).
[Vol. 46
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serious and permanent bodily injury." The statutes in Alabama and
the District of Columbia further allow therapeutic abortion to pro-
tect both the woman's life and health.25
Commencing in the early months of 196726 a number of states
began to take action on abortion reform measures.17 By the middle
of June, Colorado, North Carolina, and California had passed new
statutes based on the American Law Institute's provisions in the
Model Penal Code.2
B. The Mood for Reform
Increased public interest in the liberalization of abortion laws is
evident in the currents of modern thought.2 9 In the sphere of family
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A-5-1, -3 (1964).
' See notes 22 and 23 supra, for citation to the Alabama and District of
Columbia statutes. Massachusetts decisional law achieves a similar result.
See note 19 supra, and cases cited. Whether Maryland law is in accord
would depend on construction of the requirement that a physician be "satis-
fied... that no other method will secure the safety of the mother." MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 3 (1957). No Maryland cases illuminate this point.2 Twenty-eight state legislatures have considered bills concerning abortion
in the 1967 sessions. Ass'n for the Study of Abortion Newsletter, No. 2, at
4 (Summer, 1967).
In June of 1966 the Mississippi legislature passed a limited revision of
its act. The new provision permits abortion "by a duly licensed, practicing
physician: . . . where pregnancy was caused by rape." Miss. CODE ANN. §
2223 (1957), as amended, Miss. Laws, ch. 358 (1966).
" For a discussion of the activity leading up to the introduction and
passage of the most recent statutes see generally N.Y. Times, April 30, 1967,
at 60, col. 1 (city ed.) (Colo. act); id, § 4, at 6, col. 1; id., April 29, 1967,
at 34, col. 1 (editorial on Colo. law); id., May 9, 1967, at 36, col. 4 (N.C.
act); id., May 6, 1967, at 25, col. 5 (N.C. act); id., June 16, 1967, at 24,
col. 3 (Calif. act); id., June 14, 1967, at 19, col. 1 (city ed.) (Calif. act);
id., April 29, 1967, at 14, col. 3 (Calif. act).
"MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 207.11 & comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959), discussed in
Barnard, An Analysis and Criticism of the Model Pend Code Provisions on
the Law of Abortion, 18 W. REs. L. REv. 540 (1967); Byrn, Abortion in
Perspective, 5 DuQ. U.L. REv. 125, 132-34 (1966); Schwartz, Morals Of-fenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 669, 683-86 (1963).
"' Recent books include: ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES (M. CAL-
DERONE ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as CALDERONE]; BATES & ZAWADZIKI;
THE CASE FOR LEGALIZED ABORTION Now (A. GUTTMACHER ed. 1967);
B. DICKENS, ABORTION AND THE LAW (1966); FAMILY PLANNING AND
POPULATION PROGRAMS: A REVIEW OF WORLD DEVELOPMENTS (B. BERELSON
ed. 1966); GEBHARD; LADER; LOWE; E. SCHUR, CIMES WITHOUT VICTIMS
(1965) [hereinafter cited as SCHUR].
The number of articles on abortion reform is increasing steadily. E.g.,
Symposin--Abortion and the Law, 17 W. REs. L. REv. 369-568 (1965)
(nine articles); Barnard, supra note 28; Beilenson, The Therapeutic Abor-
tion Act: A Snall Measure of Humanity, 41 L.A.B. BULL. 316 (1966) ; Byrn,
supra note 28; Byrne, A Critical Look at Legalized Abortion, 41 L.A.B.
1968]
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planning, many citizens today do not believe that a particular moral
norm ought to be forced on all of a society unless the sacrifice
in individual liberty of choice is offset by a significant societal bene-
fit. 0 This view, as applied to the abortion reform setting, neces-
sarily further assumes that the value to be accorded to developing
fetal tissue is a subjective moral choice that ought not to be dictated
by the state. It is a premise widely shared, especially by those
individuals whom rigid abortion laws most directly affect.
Outside of the continental United States, governmental authori-
ties are less dictatorial in their demands on the pregnant woman. It
was common knowledge that until recently abortion was available
upon request in a clinical setting as near as San Juan, Puerto Rico,
and in any number of towns and cities in Mexico.8 1 Japan is also
becoming a center for aborting American women.8 2 In Japan abor-
tion is legally available for a 15 dollar fee. Surgeons must obtain
a special governmental license to perform the operation, and safe,
hygenic conditions are virtually assured.3 This contrasts markedly
BULL. 320 (1966); Leavy & Kummer, supra note 9; Moore, Unrealistic
Abortion Laws, 1 CRIM. L. BULL. No. 10 at 3 (1965); Sands, supra note 9;
Schwartz, supra note 28; Williams, Euthanasia and Abortion, 38 U. CoLo.
L. REv. 178, 187-201 (1966).
Literature of general consumption contains numerous recent discussions
of abortion as well: E.g., Byrn, Abortion: A Legal View, COMMONWEAL,
March, 1967, at 679; Coniff, The World of the Unborn, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
1967, § 6 (Magazine), at 97; Hall, Rethinking the Abortion Problem:
Medico-Legal Aspects, CRIMINOLOGICA, Feb., 1967, at 5; Lader, The Scandal
of Abortion Laws, N.Y. Times, April 25, 1965, § 6 (Magazine), at 32. See
materials cited in notes 26-29 supra for current legislative activity.
A recent survey of 40,000 American physicians found 86.9 per cent in
favor of more liberal abortion legislation. N.Y. Times, April 30, 1967, at 82,
col. 6 (city ed.). Shortly thereafter the American Medical Association issued
a policy statement endorsing the abortion reform recommendations of the
American Law Institute. Id., June 22, 1967, at 41, col. 1. At the 1967
(eighth) Conference of the International Planned Parenthood Federation,
a number of reports urged more flexible abortion statutes. The Federation
took no position on the issue. Id., April 13, 1967, at 15, col. 1 (city ed.).
And, in New York City, a large number of rabbis and ministers have formed
a group called the Clergymen's Consultation Service on Abortion to assist
and console women seeking to terminate their pregnancies. Id., May 22,
1967, at 1, col. 2.
"oSee H. HART, LAw, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 25-83 (1963); Dworkin,
Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986 (1966).
"1 Cost of an abortion in Mexico generally amounts to 300-400 dollars
exclusive of transportation and accommodations. For detailed discussion of
the availability of clinical abortion outside the United States, see CALDERONE
14-32, 200-10; GEBIARD 225-47; LADER 42-75; LOWE 96-114.
2 CALDERONE 200-03; GEBnARD 218-21; LADER 57.
"A complete discussion of abortion reform outside the United States is
[Val. 46
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with the extra-hospital setting of illegal abortion within the United
States.
Several state legislatures have passed abortion reform bills, and
the American Law Institute has proposed reform legislation as a
part of the Model Penal Code. The American Medical Association
supports the Code. In addition, the New York Civil Liberties Union
has taken the position that: "A person is guilty of abortion [only]
if he is not a duly licensed physician and intentionally terminates
the pregnancy of another otherwise than by a live birth.""a4 Re-
form measures seek to transfer the power of family planning from
the state back to the family and its physician. Further educational
and reform activities have been undertaken by the California Com-
mittee for Therapeutic Abortion in San Francisco and the Associa-
tion for the Study of Abortion in New York City, as well as nu-
merous like organizations.
The chief thrust of reform urgings has been to permit citizens-
pregnant women, their husbands, their physicians-to decide for
themselves when pregnancy ought to be terminated and to erect no
state barrier to the carrying out of conclusions which these individ-
uals privately reach. This approach does not force a single belief
concerning the propriety of abortion on others who are unwilling
to accept that belief. Those who equate abortion with sin or even
murder are permitted to entertain their beliefs privately and act on
them in their private spheres of influence. In contrast to this atti-
tude of reform is that of the sole major organized body opposing all
abortion reform-officials of the Roman Catholic Church.35 Their
beyond the purposes of this article. On European abortion reform see gen-
erally LADER 42-75; GEBMARD 221-44; Symposium-Abortion and the Law,
17 W. Rvs. L. REv. 369, 498-568 (1965).
31 LADER 169. The A.C.L.U. of Southern California has taken a like
view. It asserts that the former California abortion law (and presumably
the new legislation as well) infringes upon "the right of privacy guarantees
of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution." Calif. Comm. on Therapeutic Abortion
Newsletter, November, 1966, at 3.'
11 The National Conference of Catholic Bishops authorized a first year's
budget of 50,000 dollars to finance a campaign against the proposed abortion
reform bills introduced recently in many of the United States. Ass'n for the
Study of Abortion Newsletter, No. 2, at 5 (Summer, 1967). See also
Drinan, Strategy on Abortion, AMERIcA, February 4, 1967, at 177. But see
Letter from Richard Cardinal Cushing, Archbishop of Boston, March 19,
1963:
There is nothing in Catholic teaching which suggests that Catholics
should write into civil law the prescriptions of church law, or in any
way force the observance of Catholic doctrine on others.
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position is ultimately detrimental to the health and well being of any
woman who would choose to terminate her pregnancy. Moreover,
rigid restrictions on permissible indications for abortion force physi-
cians to refuse to treat pregnant patients according to their best
medical judgment. The woman may then risk her life by resorting
to an incompetent "butcher."
C. Modes of Reform
Abortion reform can take several routes. Statutory exceptions to
the general prohibition are more typical of recent proposals.80 Other
groups advocate the converse approach of general legal permission
to terminate pregnancy, provided the woman consents and a licensed
physician performs the operation.3 7 Supplementary to abortion re-
form are preventive measures designed better to inform large num-
bers of the citizenry concerning the availability of various contra-
ceptive means. More extensive public sex education may be needed,
as are greater facilities for seclusion for the unwed mother and
further encouragement for adoption of unwanted children.
This article is chiefly concerned, however, with abortion reform
by judicial interpretation, and the application of established consti-
tutional concepts to the physician-patient relationship. Although in-
terests at stake in the abortion controversy are diverse, subtle, novel,
and sensitive, the case appears ultimately to fit within the classical
framework of governmental interference with important interests
of individual liberty and to be capable of resolution in traditional
constitutional terms.8
Studies apparently show that Catholic individuals, as citizens, ignore
existing abortion taboos as readily as do non-Catholic citizens. See, e.g.,
Kopp, BIRTH CONTROL IN PRAcTIcE 222 (1934) (26 per cent of women
studied who had undergone abortion were Catholic); Hall, Therapeutic
Abortion, Sterilization and Contraception, 91 Am!. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNE-
COLOGY 518-32 (1965) (22 per cent of white parents studied were Catholic).
In addition, a statistical analysis of abortion convictions in New York County
from 1925 to 1950 found 49 per cent of the physicians convicted to be
Catholic, a proportion substantially higher than the 25 per cent figure repre-
senting the proportion of the American population which is Catholic. BATES
& ZAWADZI 202.
"See notes 26-28 supra, and accompanying text.
', See note 34 supra, and accompanying text. Williams, The Law of
Abortion, 5 CURRENT LEG. PROB. 128 (1952), also advocates that abortion
authority rest solely with the woman and her physician, subject to proper
medical safeguards.
" It is assumed in this article that a state has power to regulate the quali-
fications of surgeons and limit the class of "abortionists" to those who meet
[Vol. 46
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II. ABORTION AND THE VALUES AT STAKE
A. The Woman's Interests
The individual whose interests are most affected by present
abortion restraints is the pregnant woman. 9 Her rationale for seek-
ing abortion may range from matters of convenience to those of her
very existence, including her concerns for both mental and physical
health. Therapeutic hospital abortion, that is, hospital abortion for
medical indications, seldom endangers a woman's interests in life,
health, or continued fertility. ° Illegal abortions, however, are
typically performed under imperfect, unsanitary conditions, and have
killed or maimed thousands of women in the United States alone.41
The numerical inconsistency between the number of instances in
which abortion is sought and received and the number of instances in
which it is "legally" performed refutes any pretense that statutory
prohibition of abortion achieves or can ever achieve its aim of safe-
guarding the prospective mother.
4 2
certain reasonable standards. It can clearly punish the incompetent criminal
abortionist who is a potential danger to the society.
" An estimated 80-90 per cent of the pregnant women who seek abortion
are married. See also note 3 supra, and accompanying text. These approxi-
mations are borne out by records in jurisdictions where abortion is not pro-
hibited. See, e.g., LADER 120: "Over an eighteenth-month period in Finland,
85 per cent of legal abortions were performed on married women." See
also LowE 8: "'If we were to give a profile of the most common situation in
which a woman requests termination of pregnancy, we should describe a
married woman with two or three children, at the height of child-bearing,
between 28 and 40."' (Quoting Dr. Edwin Gold, Director of Obstetrics and
Gynecology at Brooklyn Hospital in New York City).
"' See, e.g., LADER 17:
In Czechoslovakia, for example, not a single death was reported in
140,000 legal abortions (1963-64); in Hungary, only two deaths in
358,000 abortions (1963-64) ; in Yugoslavia, less than five per 100,000
(1961).
The fatality rate for legal abortions in Scandinavia is slightly
higher because a slow system of committee approval and permissive
laws pushes many abortions past the three-month limit imposed in
Eastern Europe.
See also GEBHARD 136; Kumer, Post-Abortion Psychiatric Illness-A Myth?
119 Am!. J. PsYCHIATRY 980 (1963). The development of adverse psycho-
logical reactions is an infrequent result of the abortion itself and is then
generally thought to stem from "guilt imposed on the women by society."
LADER 23.
"LOWE 50: "[A]t the present time, almost 50 percent of . . . maternal
loss in New York City is directly related to the effects of an illegal termina-
tion of pregnancy.'" (Quoting Dr. Gold, note 39 supra). See also Moore,
Antiquated Abortion Laws, 20 WASH. & LEE L. Rnv. 250, 252 (1963):
"[F]or every woman who dies [from poorly performed criminal abortions]
several others are partially disabled or rendered sterile as a consequence."
" Cf. Leavy & Kummer 52.
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Virtually all states permit a pregnant woman to terminate her
condition by abortion when continued pregnancy endangers her own
life.41 "Preservation of life," however, is not a wholly unambiguous
expression; a physician cannot always be certain that his interpreta-
tion will necessarily accord with that of his conservative colleagues
or a jury.44 Moreover, the concept of "preservation of life" to a
woman often cannot be clearly distinguished from her interest in
maintaining general good health. Yet her desire to remain physically
and mentally healthy to participate with her husband in family life
and in raising children she may already have borne is not an interest
she is presently permitted to assert successfully.
Only five states specifically permit abortion in the interest of pre-
serving a woman's "health. '45 Hospitals in other jurisdictions, how-
ever, tend to permit abortion for women afflicted with some dan-
"See notes 18-23 supra, and accompanying text. The Roman Catholic
position does not even permit of this exception. Death need not be imminent;
potential danger is sufficient. E.g., State v. Dunklebarger, 206 Iowa 971, 221
N.W. 592 (1928): "[I]t was not essential that the peril to life should be
imminent. It was enough that it be potentially present though its full de-
velopment might be delayed.. .. 1" Id. at 980, 221 N.W. at 596; People v.
Ballard, 167 Cal. App. 2d 803, 335 P.2d 204 (1959): "Surely the abortion
statute does not mean ... that the peril to life be imminent." Id. at 814,
335 P.2d at 212.
The probability of a woman's committing suicide if she is denied an
abortion is a legal ground which has raised some controversy and has placed
a difficult burden on the psychiatrist. See Bolter, The Psychiatrist's Role in
Therapeutic Abortioit: The Unwitting Accomplice, 119 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY
312 (1962).
"See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 42, 227 A.2d 689, 700 (1967)
(concurring opinion) :
At times the line of demarcation between danger to life and danger
to health from the pregnancy may be a shadowy one. In such case the
honest expertise of the medical profession must be relied upon, and
where the credibility of the operating physician is in issue, the decision
as to whether he reasonably believed the woman's life was in danger
ordinarily will be left to the jury.
The medical profession in the United States appears to have over-estimated
the danger of criminal abortion prosecution. This factor has contributed in
an unknown degree to the incidence of dangerous illegal abortion and its
effect on the women who cannot obtain a hospital termination of pregnancy.
See BATES & ZAWADZKI 5. The presence of colleague opposition to abortion
and the undoubted existence of religious pressure, however, are a deterrent
to the doctor before criminal prosecution possibilities even come to mind.
"ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 9 (1958); CAL. PEN. CODE § 274-76 (1955), as
amended, CAL. LAWs, ch. 327 (June 15, 1967), effective ninety-one days
after adjournment of legislature; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 40-2-23 & 50 (1963),
as amended, ch. 190 [1967] Colo. Sess. L. 284; D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201
(1961); N.C. GEN. STAT. 14-45.1 (Supp. 1967).
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gerous conditions but not others. 46 Women ill with leukemia, lung
cancer, tumors, and crippling paralysis have frequently met "the
rationalization that another pregnancy . . . [would] not adversely
affect the course of their disease."' 7 Many hospitals, moreover, re-
fuse to abort a woman who has been the victim of rape. Others-
consider the likelihood that forced birth of a child caused by rape too
seriously threatens the family and the mental health of the woman
to deny her request.48
In the case of a woman who has taken thalidomide, or has con-
tracted rubella (German measles) in the first trimester of pregnancy,
the statutes do not recognize that possible birth of a seriously de-
formed child may impair the mother's health.49 Yet, a fertile woman
faced with such a probability usually does not wish to give birth to
that particular child; she would prefer to have a more "normal"
child at some later time. She is in much the same position as a preg-
nant woman who has no husband. Yet the same society which
ostracizes a deformed child or an unwed mother still insists that that
particular birth take place.
No statute in the United States permits a woman to terminate
her tenth pregnancy by abortion because she cannot afford to sup-
port and feed a family of ten children. A pregnant woman confined
to bed with polio faces the same rigid statute as does the woman
whose husband recently abandoned her or who has no husband.
All these cases, and others involving socio-economic factors, are
11 GEBiHARD 197; Niswander. Lader explains that:
With the exception of rubella, the physical indications for abortion
have diminished in the last decade. In this shrinking list, the majority
of the medical profession still recognizes:
Cancer of the cervix
Severe cardiac disease
Severe hypertension
Nephritis or kidney disease
Breast cancer
The disagreement, arises over such indications as pulmonary tubercu-
losis, which many experts feel is so well controlled that pregnancy
does not have to be deferred; and over such eugenic indications as
conflicting Rh factors between parents, where the risk of an infant's
becoming a lasting invalid is often discounted.
LADER 39-40 (Emphasis deleted). See also Packer & Gampell, Therapentic
Abortion: A Problen in Law and Medicine, 11 STAN. L. REv. 417 (1959),
for a questionnaire study of abortion practices in a large number of Cali-
fornia hospitals.
'T LADER 6.
LADER 36.
See note 71 infra, and accompanying text, on birth defects which
result from rubella.
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increasingly being rejected by hospital abortion committees.50 To
the wealthy, of course, the alternative of foreign abortion provides
a complete answer. Others frequently risk the danger of an illegal
abortion at the hands of an unskilled criminal abortionist. 1 To the
poor the choice is between attempted self-induced abortion and the
accompanying danger or increased poverty and powerlessness in the
face of the government mandate. In these instances the state has
determined that a woman and her physician have no authority over
family planning unless done by preventive means. If the woman has
no knowledge of contraception, or if her preventive efforts fail, 2
her interests are immediately subordinated to the government de-
termination that she must bear that specific child.
The fundamental issue at the core of all controversy over family
planning is the assertion of many women and their physicians that
no woman should, under any circumstances, be compelled to bear a
child against her will. In parts of the world this is a recognized
right,53 and in the early years of United States history there was
no norm, moral or statutory, prohibiting abortion before "quick-
ening." 4 Yet, present abortion laws completely displace the woman's
choice.Ultimately the the abortion controversy will reach the point of
facing this final and most important interest of the pregnant wom-
an: that of choosing for herself whether to have the child. No
piecemeal statutory reform can curtail criminal abortion unless it
resolves this question in the woman's favor. After all, "[i]t is the
situation of ,not wanting a child that covers the main rather than
the exceptional abortion situation."
'5
B. The Interests of the Child-to-be
The central thrust of opposition to abortion reform focuses on
asserted similarities between the contingent interest of a fetus in
"°BATES & ZAWADZKI 113-14; GEBHARD 197; RosEN 17-20; Niswander
414-20; Ryan, supra note 12, at 432. BATES & ZAWADzKI, supra, state that
"the medical indications for therapeutic abortion have shrunk to the van-
ishing point."
tSee generally BATES & ZAWADZIci 35-92.
A 1 per cent failure rate of a contraceptive in universal use would
nonetheless produce over 250,000 unwanted pregnancies each year in the
United States alone. LADER 158.
"'See notes 31-33 supra, and accompanying text.
' See note 10 supra, and accompanying text.
g Rossi, ABORTI ON LAWS AND THEIR VIcTIMS 1 (Ass'n for the Study of
Abortion reprint 1966).
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continued development and the accepted human interests in the
value of a life which is fully recognizable and whose existence and
value are agreed upon. 6 This disregards the similarities between
pre-conception and early post-conception conditions as well as, the
social and female interests in allowing a woman to choose for her-
self whether to terminate a pregnancy.
Approximately 85 per cent of all pregnancies, after firm im-
plantation, will develop to the stage of viability.5" Thus the fetus,
without external interference, would in all probability continue to
develop and be born. This factual observation forms the basis of
claims that a fetus ought to be accorded a legal right to develop
from the union of male and female cell and to be born against the
mother's will.58 Tinnelly has expressed the argument in another
form as follows:
Direct and voluntary abortion is intrinsically wrong since it is
the direct killing of an innocent human being. It is never justi-
fiable because the person who is killed has not been guilty of any
crime or unlawful aggression on account of which he could be said
to have forfeited his right to live. 9
" The opposition to abortion reform wholly subordinates any contingent
interest of a child who might have been born at a subsequent date, as is the
case when a woman would like to have three more children but cannot sup-
port them because of the expense of caring for a child born seriously de-
formed. Moreover, the full human interests of children already in the family
may be substantially affected by additional unplanned births when the state
requires the woman to continue bearing all children she conceives.
"A. Mietus & N. Mietus, Criminal Abortion: "A Failure of Law" or a
Challenge to Society? 51 A.B.A.J. 924, 925 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Mietus]. The human animal nonetheless remains highly dependent on the
cooperation of his parents and fellow beings for his entire lifetime. After
conception, but prior to implantation, an additional factor is present:
[B]iologists now know that at least one in three of all fertilized
human eggs or embryos fails to develop correctly and dies in the
uterus, resulting in spontaneous abortion or reabsorption. About
half this wastage occurs before the fourth or fifth week.
LADER 101.
Catholics do not, however, regard "spontaneous" abortions (miscar-
riages) as the death of a human being. H. PILPEL, THE. ABoRTIoN CRISIS
4 (1966).
8 For positions opposing abortion reform see Byrn, The Abortion Ques-
tion: A Nonsecterian Approach, 11 CATHOLIC LAW. 316 (1965); Drinan,
The Inviolability of the Right to be Born, 17 W. REs. L. REv. 465 (1965);
Mietus; Tinnelly, Abortion and Penal Law, 5 CATHOLIC LAW. 187 (1959).
See also authorities cited note 8, supra.
" Tinnelly, supra note 58, at 190 (emphasis added).
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The Roman Catholic view further assumes that the union of the
male and female cells at conception gives rise to a "rational soul,"10
although it is unclear what a rational soul is in a fetus that has
hardly begun to develop limbs and organs much less a cerebral
hemisphere.
A large number of substantive objections can be made to this
position."1 As applied to a fetus which has only just been conceived,
the use by Tinnelly of the expressions "human being" and "person"
is misleading, for it attempts to evade the substantive argument of
whether those terms ought justifiably to be applied to a fetus, and,
if so, what consequences follow. Their use is not unlike referring
to. an acorn as an oak. Factually, fetal tissue is unique as a physical
entity. Yet Mietus has charged that:
Some abortionists will deny that what they destroy is human
life. But if the embryo, and later the fetus be not human, what
is it? Malignant or benign tumor? Stone? Vegetable? Brute
animal ?62
This assertion overlooks the uniqueness of constituents in the pro-
creative process. The fetus, after all, is a fetus, and is a potential
infant and an entity only slightly removed from the separate male
and female cells which joined to form it. To attempt classification
with a different entity is misleading. The attributing of a "rational
soul" to a fetus is a further departure from logical precision. "Soul,"
" Lader reports that:
In vast areas of the world, by contrast, such debate has never troubled
either the public or the private conscience. Since the Shinto faith
holds that a child becomes a human being only when it has "seen the
light of day," no religious or ethical objections to abortion have ever
been raised in Japan. In Mohammedan lands, the Islamic belief is that
life begins in the fetus only after 150 days. Neither Buddhist nor
Hindu theology contains any scriptural prohibitions against early
abortion, treating it as a social rather than religious issue.
LADER 94.
"
1For objections to the Roman Catholic argument see generally BATES &
ZAW ADZKi 139-40; LADER 94-103, 167-75; LowE 92-96; ScHuR 51-55; Ryan,
Humane Abortion Laws and the Health Needs of Society, 17 W. REs. L.
REv. 424, 427-28 (1965) ; Sands, The Therapeutic Abortion Act: An Answer
to the Opposition, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 285 (1966); Trout, Therapeutic
Abortion Laws Need Therapy, 37 TEMP. L.Q. 172 (1964); Williams, Ei-
thanasia and Abortion, 38 U. CoLo. L. REv. 178, 195-201 (1966) (excellent
discussion); Note, The Antiquated Abortion Laws, 34 TEmP. L.Q. 146
(1961). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, Comment (Tent. Draft.
No. 9, 1959); materials cited note 29 supra; note 65 infra, and accompany-
ing text; cf. J. FLETCHER, MORALS AND MEDICINE 211-25 (1954).6 2Mietus 924.
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generally, is a western theological concept which exists only in the
abstract as applied to the fetus. The statutory recognition of this
concept presupposes a framework of subjective religious assumptions
about the nature of man, the acceptability of a given theological
system, and the meaning of life and death.6"
The contingent interest of being allowed to develop and be born,
then, is being asserted by an entity which is not unlike the separate
male spermatazoon and female ovum.64 Recently enacted abortion re-
form legislation rejects the view that this entity is "human" in the
ordinary use of that word. In a comment to the abortion provisions of
the Model Penal Code's suggested reform, for example, the Ameri-
can Law Institute distinguishes abortion prior to the fourth month
from destruction of a fully viable eight-month fetus and answers
the charge that abortion ought to be equated with homicide:
As to the 'homicidal' aspects of abortion, the answer of
those who would favor liberalization would be as follows:
most abortions-those which occur naturally as well as in-
duced abortions-occur prior to the fourth month of preg-
nancy, before the fetus becomes firmly implanted in the womb,
before it develops many of the characteristic and recognizable
features of humanity, and well before it is capable of those move-
ments which whefi felt by the mother are called 'quickening.'
There seems to be an obvious difference between terminating -the
development of such an inchoate being, whose chance of maturing
"I Cf. LADER 165:
The California legislature's committee on the Beilenson [Abortion
Reform] bill states: 'Clearly the Legislature cannot pass a resolution
decreeing that life begins at conception. But to base legislation solely
on this premise would in reality be the same thing, and so would re-
taining existing legislation for that sole reason.'
Much perfectly acceptable legislation, of course, embodies subjective as-
sumptions of a non-factual variety, i.e., modes of taxation, priorities of
legislation for expenditures, compulsory education, etc. However, in the
abortion context, an exceptionally acute interest in individual liberty is
asserted against what may appear as a relatively doubtful, subjective, and
contingent basis for the legislation. The virtually arbitrary nature of the
assumed legislative interest, when placed against the fundamental char-
acter of the woman's interests, is what casts doubt upon the constitutional
validity and propriety of the abortion statutes.
" Cf. LADER 164:
The core of the problem remains the meaning of the word 'life.' If
the theologian insists that the meeting of sperm and ovum produces
life, the pragmatist can point out with equal validity. that life already
exists in both the unfertilized egg and the spermatozoa. 'What escapes
most people is that life is never created .... It is simply passed on, or
snuffed out.' [Quoting Dr. Garrett Hardin, professor of biology at
the University of California at Santa Barbara].
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is still somewhat problematical, and, on the other hand, destroy-
ing a fully formed viable fetus of eight months, where the offense
might well become ordinary murder if the child should happen to
survive for a moment after it has been expelled from the body of
its mother.6 5
This explanation is even more persuasive when one considers the
probability that abortifacient drugs would normally be taken before
the first month of pregnancy had ended.60
Of further support to the view that abortion shortly after con-
ception does not interfere with an interest of the magnitude of
human life is the present established use of contraceptive loop and
intra-uterine devices which are thought to operate after conception
by preventing implantation in the uterus.67 The 1962 Proposed
Official Draft of the Model Penal Code specifically excepted these
devices from any prohibition;68 yet according to the narrow view
the "loop" devices "murder" a fertilized ovum (during each cycle)
by halting its normal course toward implantation.
It is possible to conceive of a society in which all deformed,
blind, ugly, retarded, diseased, illegitimate, lame, and poverty-
stricken individuals are accorded the maximum social and legal
amenities which would be theirs were they otherwise in good health
or endowed with financial means. Modern America has not, how-
ever, developed this degree of human understanding, and the pres-
ence of a serious physical or economic "defect" (by the society's
definition of "defect") may be sufficient to render a person's life
a torture of rejection and discrimination. A thalidomide child with
flaps instead of arms,6 9 for example, if allowed to develop, quicken,
°§ 207.11, comment 1 (6), at 149 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
"See Morris & Van Wagenen, Compounds Interfering with Ovum Iin-
plantation and Development, 96 Am. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 804
(1966).
"' On intrauterine devices and their use see generally MeLoy, Pre-Implan-
tation Fertility Control and the Abortion Laws, 41 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 183
(1964); Tietze, Contraception with Intrauterine Devices, 96 A-t. J. OB-
STETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1043 (1966).
"MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3(7) (Proposed Official Draft 1962), pro-
vides:
Nothing in this Section shall be deemed applicable to the prescription,
administration or distribution of drugs or other substances for avoid-
ing pregnancy, whether by preventing implantation of a fertilized
ovum or by any other method that operates before, at or immediately
after fertilization.
"See LADER 11 :
Infants [whose mothers had taken thalidomide] . . . almost always
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be born, and be raised may face overwhelming frustration, even
parental rejection, especially if the parents would have preferred to
postpone the pregnancy in order to bear another child at a later
date.' ° Exposure of a woman to rubella in the first three months of
pregnancy creates a 10 to 50 per cent probability that the child, if
born, may face heart disease, blindness, mental retardation, or early
death.7' Further cases involving similar considerations are those in
which the parents are mentally defective or psychotic and cannot
care for the child,' or when the mother would bear an illegitimate
child over her objection"3 and would give the infant away for im-
probable adoption if forced to continue her pregnancy.7
4
These instances can be classified as humane causes for termi-
nating a pregnancy when the health or well-being of a potential
had flaps instead of arms, or no arms at all. Often they were born
with shortened thigh bones and twisted legs. Sometimes an ear was
missing, the nose flattened, the face permanently paralyzed.
"0 The Finkbine family, for example, has borne normal children since the
incident during which Mrs. Finkbine was forced to leave Arizona and
travel to Sweden in order to obtain an abortion. The dislodged fetus was
observed to be deformed from thalidomide effects.
"1 See Members of the Rubella Study Group, Rubella: Epidemic in
Retrospect, 2 Hosl. PRAc. 27 (1967); Roy & Deutsch, The Congenital
Rubella Syndrome-Ocular Pathogenesis and Related Embryology, 62 Am.
J. OPTHAL. 236 (1966) (blindness defect); Rubella Virus and the Human
Foetus, 1965 BRIT. MED. J. 1014 (hearing impairment). See also Sheridan,
Final Report of a Prospective Study of Children Whose Mothers had Ru-
bella in Early Pregnancy, 1964 BRIT. MED. J. 536.
2 CALDERONE 78. See LADER 35: "The liberal viewpoint in psychiatry...
still considers schizophrenic and manic-depressive psychoses justifiable
grounds for abortion."
A relevant case, Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343,
276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966), recently refused to recognize an infant's claim for
relief against a hospital which had negligently supervised its mentally defec-
tive mother. The mother had been raped by another mental patient and sub-
sequently gave birth to the child. It had only elderly grandparents to raise it
and no opportunity for a normal childhood and home life, proper parental
care, or freedom from the stigma of illegitimacy.
"2 Cf. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963),
discussed in Ploscowe, An Action for "Wrongful Life;' 38 N.Y.U.L. REv.
1078 (1963); Tedeschi, On Tort Liability for "Wrongful Life;" 1 IsRL.
L. REv. 513, 529 (1966). In Zepeda an illegitimate child sought to recover
damages from his father. The court recognized that an intentional wrong
had been perpetrated but declined to grant judicial relief on the ground that
the matter was best handled by legislative action. For the argument that the
illegitimacy concept itself amounts to a denial of equal protection when used
as a basis for state action see Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great
Society-A Proposed Uniform Act on Legitimacy, 44 TEXAs L. REv. 829
(1966).
"In New York City, for example, a large number of minority group
children available for adoption have proved unadoptable for lack of demand.
See generally LADER 61.
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child would be severely impaired and the pregnant woman would
prefer to terminate this specific pregnancy in favor of a later child.
C. The Physician's Interests
Present abortion statutes offer little guidance to physicians faced
with sensitive problems brought to them by their patients.7 Most
states offer no statutory guidelines to elucidate what constitutes a
threat to the pregnant woman's life, and the distinction between a
danger to health and probable danger to life is a nebulous one. In
any given penumbral case the results reached by a large number of
physicians may be no more than personal inclination-a poor basis
for a decision of such immense importance to the woman. And,
from the viewpoint of the physician, he must realize that, in every
case, "[t]he issue is whether a doctor should be sent to prison for
performing an operation that he believes to be best for his pa-
tient.
76
In 1959 Packer and Gampel177 submitted eleven hypothetical
abortion applications to over twenty California hospitals. Of the
eleven situations, two clearly required abortion to save the life of
the mother and were hence legal. Two others were penumbral,"8
and seven had been formulated as sensitive instances which were
nonetheless clearly illegal.79 The results showed that each hypo-
thetical case would have been accepted for therapeutic abortion in
"' Leavy & Kummer 52. See British Policy on Therapeutic Abortion,
199 J.A.M.A. 199 (1966):
[M]any medical men are inhibited in advising on, or carrying out
termination of pregnancy for fear that they might have to face legal
consequences or because their professional reputation might be en-
dangered. A clear statement of law regarding medical termination of
pregnancy would for this reason be welcome.
"' Williams, Euthanasia and Abortion, 38 U. CoLo. L. REv. 178, 195
(1966).
" Packer & Gampell, Therapeutic Abortion: A Problem in Law and
Medicine, 11 STAN. L. REv. 417 (1959).
' 8Id. In a typical psychiatric-abortion setting the woman was thirty-
eight years old and had given birth to six children within ten years. After
each of the last three births she had suffered from acute depression. She
was then pregnant for a seventh time. Ten of the hospitals approved the
case; twelve rejected it. Id. at 433-34.
"' Id. The case of rubella (German measles) can hardly be thought to
endanger the mother's life. Yet six hospitals approved abortion in this in-
stance. Sixteen rejected it. Id. at 434-35. In New York City alone 329
hospital abortions were performed for rubella during the 1964 epidemic.
Hall, Present Abortion Practices in Hospitals of New York State, 23 N.Y.
MED. 124, 125 (1967).
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at least one hospital. A necessary conclusion is that physicians tend
to find the present statutory rigidity unacceptable, but are confused
and inconsistent in their interpretations of the statutes."0 As Leavy
and Kummer observed:
It is an accepted fact that pregnancies are terminated by
reputable medical practitioners in licensed hospitals for reasons
other than to preserve the life of the mother, e.g., on health, hu-
manitarian and eugenic grounds, and thus in open violation of the
law.81
Nevertheless, although no reputable physician seems to have been
prosecuted for performing an abortion in a reputable hospital,"2
the threat of colleague criticism coupled with the threat of prose-
cution are substantial deterrents to a physician's performing an
operation he believes to be best for his patient.
As a matter of professional comity courts tend to stress the
inherent competence of the medical profession for setting its own
standards in a given community. A Washington state court in 1929,
" More recently, the American Medical Association adopted a resolution
supporting the A.L.I. MODEL PENAL COnE provisions. See note 29, supra. A
survey one month before had shown that 86.9 per cent of 40,000 American
physicians favored considerable improvement on present abortion laws.
N.Y. Times, April 30, 1967, at 82, col. 6 (city ed.). A 1966 survey in New
York State established that 84 per cent of responding physicians considered
the present law too restrictive. Hall, Present Abortion Practices in Hos-
pitals of New York State, 23 N.Y. MED. 124, 126 (1967). A survey of psy-
chiatrists in the United States showed further that from 86 to 97 per cent
of those replying favored considerable liberalization over present abortion
indications. Crowley, An Analysis of a Survey of the Opinions of Psy-
chiatrists on Abortion 2 (1966), presented at the Annual Forum of the
Ass'n for the Study of Abortion, New York, N. Y. The survey of psy-
chiatrists established that they, as a group, thought that abortion problems
should be handled on a case by case basis, rather than by general rules of
categories, automatically applied. Id.
" Leavy & Kummer 53. See also Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 52-3,
227 A.2d 689, 705 (1967) (dissenting opinion of Jacobs, J.):
[I]t is well-known that abortions have been and are being performed
in good faith by highly qualified physicians in highly reputable hos-
pitals, when necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother, or
to preclude the quickening of the fetus in rubella cases and the like.
" LADER 26. Disciplinary proceedings, however, have been instituted
against two California physicians for having performed committee approved
abortions on women known to have been inflicted with rubella in early
pregnancy. No hearing on the substantive issues has yet been held. See
Shively v. Stewart, 65 Cal. 2d 475, 421 P.2d 65, 55 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1966)
(writ of mandate sought by physicians charged with criminal abortion; court
granted motion for discovery of statements made by the women and their
husbands). A comprehensive amicus curiae brief has been filed by over one
hundred and seventy physicians challenging the constitutionality of the pro-
ceedings.
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for example, held abortion justified "if the [physician] . . . in per-
forming the operation did something which was recognized and
approved by those reasonably skilled in his profession practicing in
the same community. . . ." The highest court of Massachusetts
similarly accepts the physician's judgment if it accords with "the
general opinion of competent practitioners in the community in
which he practices.""4 However, general medical opinion does not
seem to exist, and if it did, the woman's rights might vary consider-
ably from community to community depending on local taboos and
the physicians' willingness to undergo a judicial test of the relation-
ship between his attitudes and those of his brethren. The bare fact
of prosecution alone, coupled with pulpit denunciations, could wholly
destroy a physician's practice and career regardless of the outcome
of his case before a high tribunal. In effect, then, only crystal-clear
statutory language can provide the protection most physicians need.
Until that language is forthcoming or until a court establishes a
woman's absolute legal right to abortion, the reputable physician
can only turn his patient away, possibly knowing with certainty
that she will seek a criminal abortionist who operates in secrecy
under conditions endangering the woman's health and perhaps even
her life.
In sum, the physician's interest can be asserted for authority to
treat the patient according to his best judgment, for freedom from
the dangers of statutory vagueness, for greater consistency between
statutory standards and individual medical opinion, and for the
protection of patients from the dangers of incompetent criminal
abortionists.
D. The Society's Interests
The individual interests in favor of abortion reform can be col-
lectively characterized as interests of the society in recognizing the
demands of its individual citizens for rational legislation that does
not unduly impinge on individual liberty. More general social in-
terests, however, are also present that must be examined in any
complete evaluation of the interests competing for constitutional
recognition.
The society's interest in promoting public health is acutely present
"' State v. Powers, 155 Wash. 63, 67, 283 P. 439, 440 (1929).
84 See Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 315 Mass. 394, 395, 53 N.E.2d 4, 5
(1944).
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in any consideration of abortion legislation. That some one million
American women are aborted each year points out that abortion is
a major public health problem of concern to countless pregnant
women, their husbands and families, their physicians and clergy.
Further, at least two economic factors have also been urged to
support movements for abortion reform. Estimates indicate that
as much as 350,000,000 dollars each year is expended on illegal
abortion, "much of it ending up in the coffers of crime syndicates
and abortion mills."" 5 Illegal abortion then not only creates eco-
nomic demands and physical danger for the pregnant woman, but
also amounts to the third largest criminal racket in the United
States.8s A second economic consideration is concerned with using
contraception and abortion to curtail the massive births in poverty
areas of unwanted, unplanned for, and often unadoptable children.
One estimate is that "the nationwide cost of maintaining the un-
wanted children born during a single year... could run to approxi-
mately seventeen and one-half billion dollars over the seventeen
years such children can be maintained at public expense."st The
reduction of cyclical poverty conditions in this aspect is an interest
in which abortion reform becomes a desirable supplement to con-
traception and improved welfare plans.
Claims which might be classified as "moral interests" of the
society appear in various forms in the abortion controversy. Oppos-
ing abortion reform are the assertions maintained by many officials
of the Roman Catholic Church that legal abortion destroys and
somehow cheapens the value of human life.s8 Distinctions between
developing fetal tissue and fully established human life, however,
joined with the compelling interest of a woman in regulating her
own reproductive functions, appear to deprive this charge of its
thrust. Moreover, the ethical value of not forcing the subjective
moral assumptions of one group upon all other groups further dimin-
ishes the Roman Catholic position."9 As H. L. A. Hart has urged,
s LOWE 6.
88 ScHUR 25.
87 Pilpel, Outline of Talk at Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center, 9
(1964) (paper on file in offices of American Civil Liberties Union, New
York, N.Y.).
8 See notes 8, 35 & 58, supra.
"'See H. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 25-83 (1963) ; Dworkin,
Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALB L.J. 986 (1966). Of
tangential relevance are the assertions of those opposing abortion reform
that liberalization of the provisions for termination of pregnancy will lead
19681
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
"the unimpeded exercise by individuals of free choice may be held
a value in itself with which it is prima facie wrong to interfere.""0
This value has been specifically recognized and upheld in the spheres
of free speech and free exercise of religion."' Where free human
choice conflicts with religious assumptions, deference of the latter
should be required where no substantial social interest supports the
religious view.
The public knowledge that physicians and pregnant women openly
disregard present abortion laws further devalues the vital social
interest in promoting respect for the legal system and its institutions
as the just spokesmen of a free society. When large numbers of
citizens disobey a law they believe unjust or are forced to be crimin-
als or to restrict their family planning activities because of beliefs
they do not hold, an unknown amount of damage-a technical in-
jury-befalls law in its entirety. To realign the legislative attitude
toward abortion into a position consistent with the mores and atti-
tudes of that society then becomes a social interest of the highest
order.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Existing abortion laws raise significant constitutional issues.
The statutes sharply curtail a woman's freedom of choice in (1)
planning her family size, (2) risking her physical or mental well-
being in carrying a pregnancy to term, (3) avoiding the birth of
a deformed child, and (4) bearing a child who is the product of
rape or incest. Moreover, present abortion laws are (1) largely
unenforced, (2) uncertain in their scope, (3) at odds with accepted
medical standards, (4) discriminatory in effect, and (5) based upon
the imposition by criminal sanction of subjective religious values
of questionable social merit upon persons who do not subscribe to
those values. 2
to a recldess increase in extra-marital sexual activity. This does not ap-
pear to have occurred, however, where abortion has been more freely
granted. The demand for abortion comes almost exclusively from middle-
aged married women. LADER 119. See also Ryan, supra note 81, at 432:
"The fear that the availability of abortion will lead to promiscuity is sheer
nonsense...."
90 HART, supra note 89, at 21.
E.g., U.S. CONsT. amend. I; see T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL
THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT, passim (1967 ed.).
" See also Leavy & Kummer, Abortion and the Population Crisis; Thera-
peutic Abortion and the Law; Some New Approaches, 27 OnIo ST. L.J. 647,
674 (1966).
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The constitutional issues implicit in the enactment and application
of abortion laws have received scant judicial attention. Research
discloses no significant test-case or other litigation93 attacking the
constitutional power of a state to prohibit therapeutic abortion in
circumstances not endangering the pregnant woman's life. 4 More-
over, the literature of legal commentary appears to contain no in
depth examination of the constitutional issues which might be
" Brief for Dr. Anderson as Amicus Curiae at 17-36, Shively v. Stewart,
65 Cal. 2d 475, 421 P.2d 65, 55 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1966). The California statute,
as applied to physicians performing abortions for rubella indications, is
vague and uncertain, and is an unconstitutional invasion of the right to
marital privacy, the right of all persons to the best medical treatment avail-
able, and the personal freedom of licensed physicians to administer sound
medical treatment. Id.
The reports show a small number of state and lower court opinions
which mention miscellaneous constitutional questions unclearly and dispose
of them without elaborate explanation. Almost all of these antedate the
1965 decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (statute
prohibiting use of contraceptives unconstitutional; physician has standing to
raise patient's rights). See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Comm. v. Maricopa
County, 92 Ariz. 231, 375 P.2d 719 (1962); People v. Gallardo, - Cal.
App. 2d -, 243 P.2d 532 (Ct. App. 1952); Carter v. State, 155 So. 2d
787 (Fla. 1963), appeal dismissed, 376 U.S. 648 (1964); Hans v. State,
147 Neb. 730, 25 N.W.2d 35 (1946) ; Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 55,
227 A.2d 689, 707 (1967) (Weintraub, C.J., dissenting) (4-3 decision). Cf.
People v. Baird, 47 Misc. 2d 478, 262 N.Y.S.2d 947 (Dist. Ct. 1965).
" Standing to raise constitutional issues and circumstances necessitating
their immediate resolution are not overwhelmingly difficult to establish in the
abortion context. Forms of suit might include: (1) An affirmative tort claim
by a woman damaged by the state's refusal, through its hospital, to permit
the termination of her pregnancy. The hospital, however, would have had
the choice of performing the abortion and facing potential criminal prosecu-
tion under a statute presumably constitutional or refusing the application
and facing some form of possible liability for its part in unconstitutional state
action. Cf. Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., Civil No. 15486 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County, N.Y., 1965) (suit by woman against hospital which refused
abortion on rubella indications). (2) A malpractice or negligence suit for
damages on behalf of a deformed or defective child or its mother. See
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967) (malpractice suit
against physicians who had allegedly failed to inform plaintiff that she
could avoid defective birth by abortion); Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481,
223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966) discussed supra note 72. (3)
Defense to disciplinary proceedings or a criminal prosecution against a
physician who performed an abortion on a woman in a case not within the
statutory exceptions. Shively v. Stewart, 65 Cal. 2d 475, 421 P.2d 65, 55
Cal. Rptr. 217 (1966) (discovery proceeding in disciplinary action against
physicians who performed committee approved abortions on rubella indica-
tions); or (4) A declaratory judgment class action brought by gynecolo-
gists and members of hospital abortion committees seeking clarification of
their legal positions in recurring types of cases, or by practitioners who open
an abortion clinic and are threatened with criminal prosecution for offering
to perform abortions under circumstances not permitted by the statute. See
Note, Declaratory Relief in the Criminal Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1490 (1967).
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raised." Numerous reasons can be advanced for the absence of
discussion and litigation on this point. Abortion, unlike contra-
ception, remains a subject of intense taboo intertwined in the maze
of political silence, religion, life, death, and sex. In the constitutional
context it is a problem bearing few factual similarities to any de-
cisions in the 150-year expanse of pre-Griswold history. And in
theological circles, abortion is hardly a subject for light philosophical
speculation-on the contrary, it typically evokes at the outset emo-
tional charges of "murder" and "immorality" which generally are
not conducive to a full investigation of underlying issues."0
Public attention is more easily directed to contraception as a
sociological phenomenon than to abortion. Illegal abortion presently
requires surgical apparatus and active physician cooperation. More-
over, it may create serious dangers to a woman's health which do
not accompany the use of contraceptives. Also, a surgeon who per-
forms an abortion in order to provoke a constitutional test case may
not yet have the organized support which time has given to family
planning by contraceptive means. To prescribe contraceptives was,
for the physician, a far less active step of civil disobedience than to
perform a therapeutic abortion is today.
At the time of ratification of the United States Constitution, a
woman's right to an abortion within the first 40 days of pregnancy
was recognized at the common law. Ratification of the fourteenth
amendment, moreover, served to protect the "fundamental rights"
of citizens against state encroachment. Thus some foundation exists
upon which a historical claim, however weak, might be built. Strong-
er arguments against the validity of present abortion laws may be
found in current constitutional doctrines. A clear constitutional
right of marital privacy has been developed recently by the Supreme
" Occasional mention, however, is made that, after Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), a possible opening has appeared "for an attack
upon significant aspects of the abortion laws." Emerson, Nine Justices in
Search of a Doctrine, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 219, 232 (1965). See Leavy &
Kummer, Abortion and the Population Crisis, 27 OHIo ST. L.J. 647, 672-75(1966), for an excellent fundamental outline of such an argument. For an
argument that the present abortion laws are discriminatory and may be un-
constitutionally vague see H. PILPEL, THE ABoRTloN CRIsIs 6 (1966). For
the view that legislation based solely on a religious morality is constitu-
tionally suspect for that reason see Henkin, Morals and the Constitution,
63 COLUM. L. REv. 391 (1963). See also LADER 167-75.
" See notes 58-59 supra, and accompanying text.
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Court97 although its exact scope is as yet uncertain. 8 Also of
potential applicability is the constitutional policy of protecting in-
dividual liberty from unduly restrictive state legislation. The four-
teenth amendment prohibitions against discriminatory or unduly
vague laws might also be employed to invalidate state abortion
statutes. Within this framework, a constitutional attack can be
launched.
A. Individual Immunities: Privacy and Choice
Of prime significance in any judicial challenge of abortion legis-
lation is a convincing showing that the pregnant woman asserts an
interest so fundamental and compelling that it outweighs the interest
of the state in enforcing its value judgment that her pregnancy
should continue to term. Time and circumstances, moreover, com-
bine to inject unneeded emotionalism, sensitivity and taboo into the
issues. If our society were half-Mohammedan, half-Shinto, or more
insistent that individual citizens be fully informed and allowed to
plot their own family planning destinies, the case would not be so
hard (putting to one side whether bad laws make hard cases or the
converse). However, sexual taboo and anxiety cloud abortion
whether viewed as a constitutional, statutory, medical, or socio-
logical phenomenon. It is all of these.
A right to abortion by consent performed by a licensed physician
can be strongly asserted in at least three related forms within the
Bill of Rights and fourteenth amendment framework 9 9 -first, as a
" Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
" See Symposium--Cominents on the Griswold Case, 64 MIcH. L. REV.
197 (1965).
" Several theoretically feasible but unnecessary constitutional theories
are omitted from this discussion. First, whether a physician or an organiza-
tion could claim a first amendment right to inform patients as to the where-
abouts of competent abortionists. In Redwood City, California, for example,
police arrested a woman for conducting a class in methods of self-induced
abortion. The Municipal Court Judge dismissed the case on first amendment
grounds. People v. Gurner, No. 7F-460 (Mun. Ct. San Mateo, Calif., June 1,
1967). See generally Emerson, Nine J.istices in Search of a Doctrine, 64
MIcHa. L. REv. 219, 222 (1965); Emerson, Freedom of Association and
Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 24-32 (1964). Second, whether the
ninth amendment, of its own thrust, permits of a fundamental right to
abortion. See B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT (1955) ;
Franklin, The Ninth Amendment, 40 TUL. L. REv. 487 (1966); Redlich,
Are There "Certain Rights . . .Retained by the People"?, 37 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 787 (1962); Rogge, Unenumerated Rights, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 787
(1959); Note, The Uncertain Renaissance of the Ninth Amendment, 33
U. CHi. L. REv. 814 (1966). A third applicable issue is whether procedural
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fundamental right of marital privacy, human dignity, and personal
autonomy reserved to the pregnant woman acting on the advice of
a licensed physician;00 second, as a penumbral right emanating
from values embodied in the express provisions of the Bill of Rights
themselves;1°1 or, third, as a necessary and altogether reasonable
application of precedent, namely, Griswold v. Connecticut.1
02
Earlier in this century the Supreme Court invoked substantive
due process concepts to invalidate economic reform legislation.10 3
Legislation involving non-economic aspects of individual liberty,
however, does not seem to revolve around the same kinds of con-
sideration.'0 4 Ethical relativism is not inconsistent with a stable,
free, and creative society. To invalidate state acts restricting human
due process bears any other relevance than its clear applicability (along
with the equal protection clause) in cases wherein a hospital abortion com-
mittee acts on a "quota" basis which summarily denies abortion to all ap-
plicants beyond a certain successful number. This latter process, being
wholly capricious, is indefensible on its face. See Kadish, Methodology
and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication--A Survey and Criticism, 66
YALE L.J. 319 (1957). And fourth, whether non-enforcement of abortion
statutes would render their sudden revival against licensed physicians a
denial of due process. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH
143-56 (1962); Bonfield, The Abrogation of Penal Statutes by Nouen-
forcement, 49 Iowa L. REv. 389 (1964).
In all instances, moreover, it will be assumed that a physician has stand-
ing to assert the rights of his patients who stand to feel the ultimate impact
of the statute's applicability. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
..0 Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) :
The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that clearly
underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights to marital
privacy and to marry and raise a family are similar order and mag-
nitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected.
'
01 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (Douglas, J.):
[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help them life and sub-
stance.
See also id. at 494 (Goldberg, J. concurring):
The right of privacy is a fundamental personal right, emanating
'from the totality of the constitutional scheme under which we live.'
12 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
... E.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
' The distinction has been pointedly recognized by courts and in the
literature on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Kadish, supra note 99; Rostow,
The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARv. L. Rnv. 193 (1952) ;
cf. Hemkin, Morals and the Constitution, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 391 (1963).
The present court uses substantive due process sparingly in the economic
sphere. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v.
Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). But cf. Paulsen, The Persistence of
Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REv. 91 (1950).
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liberty is to permit an often desirable diversity in human activity
without forcing one immutable moral system upon all citizens.
Increasingly the Court has recognized the positive value of diversity
in democratic society and has rejected majority demands for con-
formity in, for example, public modes of expression, 10 5 activities in
association with others, 0 6 personal political beliefs,1'0 and individual
educational interests.'08 In increasing its protection of the individual
from government compulsion the Court has repeatedly enunciated
basic guidelines with which to coordinate its case-by-case -process
of adjudication. Thus, the justices in 1960 stated:
Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty,
the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest
which is compelling.109
And, for legislation impinging on fundamental liberties, "precision
of regulation must be the touchstone .. ."10
Justice Stewart, for a majority of the Court in Shelton v. Tuck-
er"' also emphasized the stringent requirements a state must meet
if it is to subordinate the fundamental interests of its citizens. He
wrote that:
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though
the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that pur-
pose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.
The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light
of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose."i 2
In other language the Court has recognized the dangers of overly
broad statutes and required that they be limited because, in Justice
Brennan's words, "the threat of sanctions may deter ... almost as
potently as the actual application of sanction ....
Not all of the Court's decisions in defense of individual liberty
have come from activities involving the freedoms of speech and
"
5 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
SNAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
l Gibson v. Florida Leg. Invest. Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
... Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
... Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
... NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
-1364 U.S. 479 (1960).
" Id. at 488.
,18 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
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association. Prince v. Massachusetts,'4 for instance, emphasized
"the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter,"
and earlier, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,15 the Court found un-
constitutional an Oregon statute which prohibited parents from send-
ing their children to private schools. This, the Court held, "un-
reasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their con-
trol.""x6
Utilizing a necessarily vague "privacy" formulation the Court
has carved out other areas of human activity into which government
is forbidden to probe." 7  In Mapp v. Ohio"8 a majority of the
justices referred to the fourth amendment as creating a "right to
privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and par-
ticularly reserved to the people," and previously the Court had recog-
nized as a "constitutional purpose . . . to maintain inviolate large
areas of personal privacy.""' Finally, in Griswold v. Connecticut,'2"
the Court voided a state statute purporting to outlaw the use of
contraceptives by married couples. This enactment violated a "mari-
tal right of privacy" found by Justice Douglas and a majority of the
Court to be necessarily implicit in the cumulative values discernible
from several more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights.
121
The applicability of these principles to state abortion legislation
will be at the heart of any effort by the medical profession to achieve
abortion reform by challenging a state's authority to prohibit the
114321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
115268 U.S. 510 (1925).
11 Id. at 534-35.
"" See generally Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Su-
prenze Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 212; Westin, Science, Privacy, and Free-
dom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970's, 66 CoLUM. L. Rnv. 1003 (1966);
Yankwich, The Right of Privacy: Its Development, Scope and Limitations,
27 NOTRE DAME LAW. 499 (1952).
11 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
11 Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 490 (1944).
120381 U.S. 479 (1965).
211 See note 101 supra. A right of marital privacy could be articulated
through at least three routes of conventional constitutional interpretation:
first, as a right necessarily implied from an existing provisions of the Bill
of Rights; second, as a choice authorized by the ninth amendment when
values of liberty would otherwise be sacrificed to clearly unreasonable
legislation; or third, as an aspect of substantive due process. See Emerson,
Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 Micir. L. REV. 219, 220 (1965);
Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded
Law of Privacy, 64 MicH. L. REv. 197, 206-08 (1965).
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termination of pregnancy when a woman so desires and her physician
finds it necessary in his sound medical judgment.
From the viewpoint of many women, restrictive abortion legis-
lation of any kind imposes a severe burden on female existence
without corresponding benefit. If a woman believes that life began
in the "prehistoric slime" and is not created but only passed along
by conception and that a fetus in early development need not be
accorded a right to continue growing within her body, she is none-
theless prohibited from acting freely on that belief even immediately
after she discovers that she is pregnant. Were she living in Japan
she would face no such governmental interference; in this respect,
she would be considerably less at the mercy of the state in Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Moreover, in the United States prior
to the 1860-1890 period she would have had a common law right
to terminate her pregnancy provided she did so before "quickening."
An abortion normally takes place considerably earlier in time than
this.
The right to terminate her pregnancy shortly after conception
may seem to a woman to be much more fundamental and of greater
day-to-day importance in her life than the right to send her children
to a private school, 22 to associate with others for the advocacy of
ideas,' 2 3 or to be free from racial discrimination in seeking an edu-
cation.' 24 To secure an abortion may seem to her an infrequent,
but necessary step when the exercise of her fundamental right to
contraception has not been successful. It is an anomaly that a woman
has absolute control over her personal reproductive capacities so
long as she can successfully utilize contraceptives but that she for-
feits this right when contraception fails. Clearly no government is
permitted to compel the coming together of the egg and spermato-
zoon. Why then should the state sanctify the two cells after they
have come together and accord them, over the woman's objection,
all the rights of a human being in esse? If the logic behind present
abortion laws were rigorously followed, abortion would be treated
as murder punishable by death or life imprisonment, and perhaps
a clearer focus would emerge. If an aborted woman and her phy-
sician were tried for "homicidal abortion," convicted, and sentenced
1' Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
1'. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
'2" Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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to death, few would consider the result justifiable. It isa result,
however, that follows from defining the fetus as a human being.
No one holds full funeral services for the products of miscarriage.
Certainly no one would suggest that a woman who miscarries regu-
larly four weeks after each conception could be required by law
to seek medical treatment to prevent future miscarriages, or other-
wise be sentenced to death. The definition of a fetus as a "human
being," is at odds with the view that conception is only one point
in the transmission of life, not the beginning of it. It disregards
the physical and developmental similarities between the embryo and
the constituents which come together at conception. In the end the
pregnant woman and her physician are required to abide by a re-
ligious belief which severely restricts their fundamental interests.
Once it is recognized that present abortion laws represent an enforce-
ment of dogma in which the state has no legitimate interest, the
woman's right to choose for herself comes into clearer focus.
At the time of ratification of the United States Constitution the
states and colonial assemblies left to the individual the choice of
value to be accorded the fetus before quickening. It is the assump-
tion by the states of authority to make this value judgment and to
force it upon citizens protected by the Constitution which threatens
the constitutional validity of state abortion legislation. There is no
basis in descriptive and physical "reality" on which to declare that
a one-month fetus is henceforth a human being. At the time when
the vast majority of abortions take place a fetus is an acorn, not an
oak. To make the decision that a fetus ought to be considered a
human being is a subjective belief of religious character, a value
assumption of the kind normally left in a free society to the de-
cision of those individuals most intimately concerned. There is no
valid state interest in implementation of religious belief sufficient
to serve as a basis for legislation, particularly when substantial in-
dividual rights are threatened. At the present time, moreover, there
is in common use a contraceptive device known as the "Lippes loop"
which apparently halts the progress toward birth after fertilization,
possibly even after implantation. The mechanism is uncertain and
difficult to discern experimentally. For the state to forbid these
devices on the presumptive theory that they destroy a human being
(each month) would, on like reasoning, fail for lack of constitutional
power as would any attempt to prosecute a woman who had used
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the loop twelve months on that number of counts of murder. The
same line of reasoning will also apply when an oral abortifacient is
developed which can dislodge a fetus from the uterus wall shortly
after conception and implantation. To label this "murder" would
appear outside of the state's authority and a patently unreasonable
legislative act.
The values implicit in the Bill of Rights suggest that the decision
to bear or not bear a child is a fundamental individual right not
subject to legislative abridgement-particularly in light of Griswold
v. Connecticut. 5 Several clauses in the first amendment suggest
underlying policies which open to question the validity of abortion
statutes. While the guarantees of free speech and free exercise of
religion primarily protect the expression of ideas and beliefs, they
provide substantial protection for the acting out of personal ideas
and beliefs. Conduct as well as thought is protected where intimately
related to the thought and no substantial state interest in prohibiting
the conduct intervenes. The Pierce case,'26 for example, protected
the parents' conduct in sending their children to private school. The
Court relied on due process to protect those who act upon a belief
in the values of private education. Non-violent conduct associated
with picketing and peaceful assembly also comes within the first
amendment although far more than thought and talk is involved. 2 7
In Griswuold, the prescription and use of contraceptives involved
some conduct, yet the Court relied in part on necessary implications
of the first amendment which were said to protect associational
conduct.
As a practical matter religion is inextricably intertwined in the
abortion subject. The establishment and abridgement clauses of the
first amendment are philosophically relevant although technically
outside traditional constitutional doctrine as applied here.' If a
.. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
12 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
E.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
' The conduct involved in snake ritualizing, polygamous marriage, and
commercial activities on Sunday has been refused protection from state
action on the ground that it is activity which infringes a secular interest
and is therefore subject to state regulation. E.g., McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Maryland Sunday closing laws upheld over estab-
lishment clause objections). But see Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878) (polygamy not a permissible religious freedom); Hill v. State, 38
Ala. App. 404, 88 So. 2d 880 (1956); Harden v. State, 188 Tenn. 17, 216
S.W.2d 708 (1948) (statutes outlawing snake handling upheld); Barron,
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woman and her physician do not believe that the fact of conception
brings into existence an entity which can immediately be equated in
value with a human being, they may not act on that belief to protect
her health, plan her family, or avoid the results of contraceptive
failure. They are required to believe that the fetus equals a human
being in value regardless of personal or religious or philosophical
views on the matter and regardless of the lack of development of
the fetus. She is thus forced to bear the child. State abortion pro-
hibitions seemingly are the product of religious pressure and of a
religious attitude which, although seemingly not immutable, and
considered by many to be "immoral," must be accepted by all mem-
bers of the community. To a limited extent, a case can also be made
that abortion reform has thus far failed in the legislatures because
of organized religious pressure. 29 To the extent that a religious
purpose has entered into the retention of strict abortion laws, a
technical violation of the establishment clause would appear pres-
ent; 130 at the minimum this violation is a factor to be considered in
the cumulative effect of constitutional policies weighing against that
law.
A fourth amendment right of marital privacy, partially relied
on in the Griswold case, also appears in the abortion controversy.
If the right of the parents to plan the size and time of arrival of
children is within the scope of this marital privacy, the state's
threat of prosecution in cases of pregnancy terminated by abortion
is an intrusion into that privacy. The parallel is best illustrated in
the hypothetical case of an oral abortifacient taken after conception
to prevent birth. To prove use of such an abortifacient prosecution
authorities might find it necessary to invade the home and inquire
as to the acts leading to and terminating the pregnancy. They might
Sunday in North America, 79 HARV. L. REv. 42 (1965). Thus when a
matter of both religious and secular cognizance is at issue the religion clauses
of the first amendment lose any conclusive relevance. However, a secular
claim arising from a religious belief is suspect when it seriously inhibits
the freedom of action of those who disavow the belief and rests solely on
that belief.
"'See LADER 94-116, for discussion of the organized religious pressure
brought to bear against abortion reform legislation.
... U.S. CoNrsT. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion. . . ." On the establishment clause see generally
A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES(rev. ed. 1964); Cahn, The "Establishment of Religion" Puzzle, 36 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1274 (1961).
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also have to invade the physician-patient relationship and search
the physician's office for evidence of abortifacients or for surgical
apparatus and medical records. Griswold took a dim view of such
probing into intensely private relationships. The case suggests that
abortion prohibitions exceed and violate the United States Constitu-
tion. 1' 1
Griswold ended a two decade legal struggle to void an unenforced
Connecticut statute outlawing the use of contraceptives and punish-
ing physicians who aided and abetted such use. Much like the abor-
tion statutes, this anti-contraceptive measure was publicly ignored
and symbolized only the timidity and election-mindedness of law-
makers. Contraceptives were available in drugstores or by prescrip-
tion just as abortion is available, at an elevated cost, for those with
the proper contacts. Moreover, the Connecticut statute worked a
second discrimination against the poor in that it precluded the open-
ing of birth control clinics. Further, the Connecticut prohibition
forbade reliable family planning just as abortion laws preclude rapid
termination of pregnancy immediately after a failure of contracep-
tion is discovered. The only factual difference between the acts
forbidden by the Connecticut statute and acts forbidden by abortion
laws is that ovum and spermatozo6n which can be kept apart
under Griswold's holding have come together and have begun to
grow into an embryo. An oral abortifacient would halt the growth
at a very early stage by releasing the implanted cells from the wall
of the uterus. Surgical abortion, also, separates the fetus from the
wall of the uterus, most abortions occurring substantially before the
third month and before the fetus has developed to any degree. In
"I See Leavy & Kummer, Abortion and the Population Crisis; Thera-
peutic Abortion and the Law; Some New Approaches, 27 OHIo ST. L.J.
647, 674 (1966):
A comparison of the Connecticut law and a typical anti-abortion
statute leads to the conclusions that: (1) both statutes are at war with
currently accepted standards of medical practice; (2) both statutes
invade the sacred realm of marital privacy by denying married
couples the right to plan the future of their family; (3) both statutes
force the birth of deformed children, or leave abstinence as the alterna-
tive; (4) both statutes are largely unenforced, nevertheless prosecu-
tion hangs like a cloud over the medical profession; (5) both statutes
result in discrimination against people in lower economic brackets;
(6) both statutes are in conflict with one of the world's most critical
problems today, the liopulation explosion; (7) both statutes involve the
imposition of a religious principle on the entire community by govern-
ment sanction.
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view of the substantial interests of the woman which are involved
and the subjective, minimal state interest in denominating the grow-
ing cells as "human," Griswold appears reasonably applicable to the
invalidation of abortion legislation, particularly where applied to
the marital relationship and where the woman asserts her strong
interest in avoiding damage to her physical or mental health, in
avoiding the product of rape or incest, or where she asserts some
other interest important to her. Griswold, on its facts, protected a
general interest in planning a family without state interference;
consequently it may apply with even greater force where the woman
asserts additional justification for an abortion.
B. The Fetus' Claim to Due Process and Equal Protection
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
requires that states accord "due process of law" and "equal protection
of the laws" to any person within their respective jurisdictions and
that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and sub-
ject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside (emphasis added)." Whether the
living male and female reproductive cells (spermatozo~n and ovum)
constitute a "person" within the meaning of the fourteenth amend-
ment before fertilization would seem to be fully settled in the nega-
tive. After conception, however, the initiation of growth toward
eventual human status has prompted some observers to argue that
a liberalized abortion law would deprive the fetus of that due process
to which they silently assume it to be entitled."8 2 This claim is not
developed with any seriousness in the literature 8  and was not even
mentioned in the extensive comments to the Model Penal Code's
proposed abortion reform act.184 It can be dismissed by pointing
out that the early fetus, similar in shape and functioning to the con-
stituents which came together to form it, bears scarcely any developed
""2 E.g., Byrn, Abortion in Perspective, 5 DuQ. U.L. REv. 125, 135
(1966).
"' Sands, The Therapeutic Abortion Act: An Amwer to the Opposition,
13 U.C.L.A.L. Rzv. 285, 305-06 (1966), notes the absence of any serious
claim that a fertilized ovum is a "person" within the reasonable application
of the due process clause.
.. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959). But see Byrn, Abortion in Perspective, supra note 132, for an argu-
ment that the child-to-be must be recognized as a legal entity for fourteenth
amendment purposes, and that the MODEL PENAL CODE deprives the child-
to-be of due process of law and equal protection of the laws.
[Vol. 46
STATE ABORTION STATUTES
characteristics at the time abortion normally takes place. If life-
transmission is recognized as a continuous process in which con-
ception plays only the part of increasing and re-directing growth,
contraception and abortion differ only in degree. Both are employed
to prevent a birth several months in the future. Both "kill" living
tissue, but only in the same sense that oral contraceptives cause the
unfertilized egg to die at the end of each cycle. True, "an abortion
kills something. The 'developing human organism,' which was alive
and growing before the interruption of the pregnancy, is dead after
it.' 35 The growth, however, is unlike the growth of a living child.
The death is like the death of an unfertilized egg, not like the
slaying of a newborn infant. No compulsive law can equate the
two and still conform with the principle of treating like things alike.
To force women and their physicians to equate them would be only
a short step from holding that the use of contraceptives itself is a
form of murder. While contraception does result in the "death"
of millions of ova and billions of spermatozoa during the first hours
and weeks of their existence no civilized society has ever proposed
capital punishment as a penalty for the use of contraceptives. Fuk-
thermore, with the coming advent of an operative abortifacient drug,
the fetus will then be discharged even before it becomes visible to
the human eye. The basis, therefore, on which a legislature would
attempt to equate fetal tissue with a "person" appears to be substan--
tial and to raise no colorable due process question. If one concludes
that a legislature has no authority on which to frustrate a pregnant
woman's interests by re-defining the term "person," then no issue
as to whether the fetus is deprived of due process is raised. It may
be a wholly innocent fetus, but it is no more a "person" than the
newly fertilized ovum or the spermatozoon which is prevented from
fertilizing the ovum by contraceptive means.
C. State Police Power Over Health, Welfare, and Morals
Throughout American constitutional history state power has
been considered plenary in its own sphere 30 subject only to certain
constitutional limitations. 137 State authority has been constitutional-
"" Byrn, Abortion in Perspective, supra note 132, at 126.
"' U.S. CozrsT. amend. X. See, e.g., Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938).
.. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 9[3], 10[1]-[3]; art. IV, §§ 1, 4; art. VI
[2]; amend. XIII-XV, XXIV. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963);
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ly extended to prohibit polygamy,138 forbid obscenity,"'0 punish for-
nication, 140 and compel smallpox vaccination.1 41 In all cases, how-
ever, the state legislation must rest on a non-arbitrary basis and
the means pursued must bear a reasonable relationship to the legiti-
mate object sought to be achieved.' 42
Several grounds can be advanced as reasonable bases on which
to rest state legislation which prohibits abortion except to protect
the life of the pregnant woman. First, the state can urge that
abortion statutes exist in part to protect pregnant women from the
dangers of criminal abortionists and "quack" abortifacient home
remedies. 3  Second, a state may urge that an abortion prohibition
acts as a reasonable deterrent to illicit intercourse-premarital or
extramarital-by raising the stakes for such intercourse.144 The
third and most significant claim is that state abortion acts protect a
contingent interest in being born-an interest of the fetus, after
conception and implantation in the womb. The third claim appears
to be the chief distinction between the assertion of a fundamental
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
.1. E.g., Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
""E.g., Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967) (per curiam);
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Alberts v. California,
354 U.S. 476 (1957).
... E.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (assumed in
opinion but not argued); Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1882) (assumed in
opinion but not argued).
mE.g, Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922); Jacobson v. Massa-
chusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
", See Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-
A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957).
"' The assertion of a desire to protect the woman's health by for-
bidding abortion appears both ironic and not reasonably or rationally related
to health as an object of legislation. If abortion is sometimes needed to pro-
tect the woman's health, the statute acts to damage health by requiring
forced birth or resort to criminal abortion. If desired on non-health grounds,
therapeutic abortion in a hospital setting only rarely endangers health, and
would serve to protect the woman from the dangers of criminal abortion.
Yet this protection is withdrawn by the statute. Only when a market for
criminal abortion exists can the statute be urged to protect the woman's
health by deterring the incompetent abortionist. The state, however, by its
prohibition, tends to create the very ground on which it partially attempts
to base this legislation.
... The Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
necessarily rejected this ground as an asserted basis for legislation pro.
hibiting the marital use of contraceptives. Like reasoning seems clearly
applicable to a state's attempt to curb alleged rampant "immorality" by
prohibiting abortion. See also note 89 supra.
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right to the use of contraceptives and the right to abortion when
contraception fails. The first and second grounds for abortion stat-
utes lack sufficient constitutional merit to warrant further examina-
tion.1 45
(1) The Vagueness Argument 4 "
State acts which prohibit abortion "without lawful justifica-
tion"'147 and "except to save the life of the mother"' 4 arguably can
be challenged on grounds that they are so vague as to deprive a
physician of that due process of law guaranteed him by the four-
teenth amendment.'4 9 Medical opinion on the propriety of abortion
... See notes 143, 144 supra.
1,. On the "void for vagueness" doctrine in constitutional law see gen-
erally Aigler, Legislation in Vague or General Terms, 21 MIcH. L. Rlv.
831 (1923); Amsterdam, The Void for Vaguenesss Doctrine, 109 U. PA.
L. REv. 67 (1960); Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal,
40 CORNELL L.Q. 195 (1955); Note, Due Process Requirements of Definite-
ness in Statutes, 62 HARV. L. REv. 77 (1948).
"" For an argument that a statute is unconstitutionally vague which for-
bids abortion "without lawful justification," see the dissenting opinion of
Chief Justice Weintraub in Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 55, 227
A.2d 689, 707 (1967).
... A comparable indefiniteness exists in those few states whose statutes or
decisional law permit therapeutic abortion "to protect the health of the
mother." A determination as to what condition during pregnancy en-
dangers the woman's "health," in what way, and to what extent, may be
highly subjective. Far more extensive and detailed clarity, moreover, is
possible by a detailed enumeration of specific allowable indications coupled
with a provision, for example, that the concurrence of two physicians or
approval by a hospital committee shall be conclusive. Because of the intense
emotional aura surrounding the socio-moral-economic issues of abortion the
physician is in special need of clear guidelines. His risk is exceptionally
high-his professional career-consequently the need for "breathing space"
appears unquestionably dire. Cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
'Q Uncertainty and disagreement within the medical profession as to
justifiable indications for abortion have only recently been examined and
documented. See Packer & Gampell, Therapeutic Abortion: A Problem in
Law and Medicine, 11 STAN. L. R-v. 417 (1959). Lack of helpful clarity
in the statutory language is known to be present, however, but in difficult to
quantify. Reputable practicing physicians, moreover, have only begun to voice
their objections to rigid abortion laws, and in the past criminal convictions have
almost never resulted from good faith activities engaged in by physicians
of good community reputation. Consequently state appellate courts have
given short shrift to vagueness challenges. People v. Rankin, 10 Cal. 2d
198, 74 P.2d 71 (1937), for example, upheld the California abortion statute
as not unduly vague, and Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 315 Mass. 394, 395,
53 N.E.2d 4, 5 (1944), found the Massachusetts abortion prohibition to be
"sufficiently full and accurate to protect the rights of the defendants." Ac-
cord, Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967) (by implica-
tion) ; Hans v. State, 147 Neb. 67, 22 N.W.2d 385, vacated on other grounds,
147 Neb. 730, 25 N.W.2d 35 (1946); cf. Carter v. State, 155 So. 2d 787
(Fla. 1963).
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varies substantially in penumbral cases; surveys now document this
disagreement and uncertainty with considerable specificity.50 Dis-
agreement is particularly sharp where an abortion is needed to protect
the woman from severe damage to her physical or mental health,
to avoid the products of incest or rape, or to prevent deformed births
where contraception has failed. In these close cases a physician is
frankly at the mercy of his colleagues and local prosecuting authori-
ties. If the prosecutor or the clergy in his community is rampantly
against any abortion, the physician may be required to reject his
best judgment in a case which, in another community, would afford
ample grounds for terminating a pregnancy.
In the Supreme Court "the doctrine of unconstitutional indefinite-
ness has been used . . . almost invariably for the creation of an
insulating buffer zone of added protection at the peripheries of
several of the Bill of Rights freedoms."'' To the extent that a
woman is asserting a fundamental right of control over her repro-
ductive organs, the void for vagueness doctrine seemingly applies
to abortion laws and is worthy of consideration in that context.
On one hand the Court has stated that "a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due pro-
cess . . .,"15 recognizing that "broad language may throttle pro-
tected conduct."''  In the eyes of the Court "it would certainly be
dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch
all possible offenders and leave it to the courts to step inside and
say who could be rightfully detained and who should be set at
large."' It has, on the other hand, with minimal predictability
applied Holmes' admonition that "the law is full of instances where
a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury
subsequently estimates it, some matters of degree. If his judgment
"' E.g., Packer & Campell, supra note 149.
1.1 Amsterdam, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine In The Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rav. 67 (1960).
15. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
.. Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL
L.Q. 195, 219 (1955).
... United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 224, 221 (1875). The same point is
made by Weintraub, C.J., in his dissent to Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22,
55, 227 A.2d 689, 707 (1967).
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is wrong, not only may he incur a fine or a short imprisonment...
he may incur the penalty of death."'15
At least three factors work in favor of applying the due process
definiteness requirements to borderline indications for abortion:
the fundamental character of the woman's claim, the documented
uncertainty in opinion within the medical profession and the con-
sequent deterrence, and the availability to the legislature of far more
specific language and procedure to protect both the woman and her
physician. The absence of closely relevant precedent on this point
would render speculative any estimate of whether a court might take
this avenue of decision.
The scope of a holding that the standard of "saving the woman's
life" is too indefinite, however, presents further complexities; a
state may clarify its statutory provisions, but rewrite them so strictly
as still to contravene asserted fundamental liberties. In this case
the liberties would only be clearly contravened. Apparently, there-
fore, a vagueness holding would resolve only half of the dilemma.
A second question is where, if at all, the legislature may draw its
line. This issue has been examined in Part IIn A.
(2) The Equal Protection Requirement: Nonresidence and Poverty
Not all inequities in law and society are remediable at the instance
of the judiciary. The wealthy and knowledgeable undeniably have
their prerogatives, at least in the spheres of private social activity,
and the courts are sometimes even hailed or criticized as the guar-
dians of special privilege. But when a "State" denies "to any person
within its jurisdichtion the equal protection of the laws"15 as ulti-
mately construed by the highest court of the nation, that person may
act to relieve the inequity by a suit for injunction,'5 7 relief from
prosecution,'58 or in many cases for civil damages.'59 And, "where'
'55 Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913).
""U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added).
"" E.g., Griffin v. School Bd. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
"8 Relief from prosecution may result from invalidating the state statute
altogether, e.g., Loving v. Commonwealth, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954), or refusing to apply it in a discriminatory fashion,
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516
(1960), or, often to the same effect, permitting removal of the state prose-
cution from a state to a federal court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1443, 2241 (1958),
although this process is subject to substantial limitations. See, e.g., City of
Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966); Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S.
780 (1966).
... See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1958), and 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C.
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fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them
must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined."'00 Initially the
open-ended language of the fourteenth amendment was used against
state sanctioned racial discrimination. It now encompasses, how-
ever, all state created or publicly administered classifications,"'1
patent or latent, which effectively discriminate against persons in
any arbitrary and irrelevant manner.' 62
Of those persons unable to obtain legal hospital abortion, the
following, and their physicians, appear to be the most disadvantaged
by present medical and law enforcement practices: (1) the woman
whose life is not endangered by carrying a pregnancy to term; (2)
women who belong to poverty-level minority groups and can only
make use of charity and ward facilities;163 (3) women who are un-
able to use effective contraceptive means; and (4) women who are
not legal residents of states with reasonable abortion laws and who
are barred from treatment in other states because of legislation or
coercive regulations forbidding the treatment of non-residents.
1 0 4
A. Discrimination Against the Poor.
Assuming, arguendo, that a hospital performs a "public function"
subject to the fourteenth amendment in determining whether an
abortion should be performed,'05 and that some abortion "regulation"
1983 (1958), which impose civil liabilities on any person who deprives an-
other of his civil rights "under color of" state or local law or custom. See
also Note, Federal Civil Action Against Private Individuals for Crimes
Involving Civil Rights, 74 YALE L.J. 1462 (1965).
160 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
'- Kotch v. Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
162 See, e.g., Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CALIF. L. REv. 341, 358 (1949):
The imposition of special burdens and the granting of special benefits,
must always be justified. They can only be justified as being directed
at the elimination of some social evil, the achievement of some public
good.
For a discussion of minority groups and their abortion practices and
problems see generally CALDERONE 67, 76-80; GEBHARD 195; LADER 66;
LOWE 55.1
'At the present time only one jurisdiction has a residence requirement.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1967). See also Colorado Medical Soc'y,
Abortion Guidelines (1967) ("voluntary" refusal to treat nonresidents sug-
gested).
"I It appears unquestionable that the function of hospital committees
and individual members of the medical profession in reviewing applications
for the legal termination of pregnancies amounts to "state action" as that
phrase is used by courts in considering challenges to the allegedly dis-
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is constitutionally permissible,16 6 a claim can be made out from docu-
mented statistical evidence that indigent ward patients, as contrasted
with financially able private patients, are the victims of systematic
inequalities in the administration of hospital abortion procedures.
The factual inequities between an indigent woman and her well-
to-do fellow citizen permit the latter to obtain legal or illegal foreign
abortion; no reasonable argument can be made that a state is required
to equalize this circumstance by financing such extra-territorial ex-
peditions. Nor can the state, by any stretch of judicial argumenta-
tion, be thought to involve itself with the expensive criminal abor-
tionist, even though state officers have been charged with knowledge
of his extra-statutory activities. At least two forms of unreasonable
state classification, however, do appear to be practiced which violate
the clear command of the fourteenth amendment and would form
a basis for limited judicial relief.
One form of classification employed by some hospital abortion
committees is to approve only a limited number of abortion appli-
cations each month, rejecting all those subsequently filed regardless
of indications. 67 This is similar to granting only a fixed quantity
criminatory application of statutes. See, e.g., Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511
(1967) (disciplinary proceedings of bar association are "state action");
other factors establishes "state action"); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.
Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964) (that restaurant licensed plus
267 (1963) (public statements of city officials given same effect as ordinance
requiring segregation). See also Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
U.S. 715 (1961); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Ala-
bama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Everett v. Riverside Hose Co., 261 F. Supp.
463 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See generally St. Antoine, Color Blindness But Not
Myopia: A New Look at State Action, Equal Protection, and "Private"
Racial Discrimination, 59 MIcEr. L. REv. 993 (1961); Van Alstyne & Karst,
State Action, 14 STAN. L. Rav. 3 (1961).
.". Although it is clear that a state may permissibly require only licensed
surgeons to be eligible for terminating pregnancies, the sensitivity and
uniqueness of abortion as a constitutional issue injects uncertainty into any
prediction of the outcome of actual litigation over the permissibility of for-
bidding abortion. Consequently, collateral constitutional issues, such as un-
constitutional vagueness and discrimination against minority groups, require
elaboration as they too pose pressing demands for relief and at the same
time raise substantial federal questions.
... Hospital over-crowding provides no justification for this practice.
The number of legal abortions granted twenty-five years ago was more than
three times that presently approved. Crowded hospitals, moreover, are state-
created circumstances which can be alleviated. See LADER 24. Moreover, an
abortion is a simple operation which does not require complex hospital
facilities. The private physician, if he is not prevented, can perform an abor-
tion in his own offices or in a simple clinic. See N.Y. Times, June 4, 1967,
§ 6, at 6 (city ed.), for discussion of a new abortion technique which can be
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of appendectomies or tonsilectomies within a given period of time.
The purpose of such a "quota" system bears no relation to the health
interests asserted by a pregnant woman.' If the quota provides
for only four abortions each month, and the fifth suitable applicant
evinces identical indications to the fourth, she nonetheless is denied
her request. This form of classification, in the equal protection
context, is known as the "perfectly unreasonable."" 9 The sole pur-
pose, avoidance of political and religious pressure, does not justify
a legal classification which denies the fundamental rights of persons
situated identically, except in time, to those whose rights are ac-
corded recognition.'
As to ward and charity patients, "the mere state of being without
funds is a neutral fact-constitutionally an irrelevance, like race,
creed, or color.'1 7  Yet, "today, almost 80 per cent of all abortion
deaths occur among non-white (including both Puerto Rican and
Negro) women."' 2 And, in a recent year, of the maternal deaths
from criminal abortion in the county of New York, 50 per cent
were Negro, 44 per cent Puerto Rican, and only 6 per cent other.17
Within the hospital the care of obstetrical patients may be viewed
as an undertaking of public character which a hospital must per-
form even-handedly and with circumspect regard for the equal pro-
tection mandate.' 7 4 Taken in this light a discriminatory practice of
carried out in "30 seconds." In any event, "overcrowding" is never a serious
question in this context. To advocates of quotas it is an afterthought. For
the limited data presently available on "quotas" see LADER 27-30; N.Y. Times,
April 25, 1965, § 6 (Magazine), at 59.
"' Hospitals presumably employ a quota system to avoid external criticism
and pressure from religious and political groups. State residence require-
ments rest on an identical basis.
"' Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 162, at 348.
Id. at 358-61; cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Buchanan v.
Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
"" Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184 (1941) (concurring opinion).
... LADER 66. See also H. PILPEL, THE ABORTION CRISIS 3 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as PILPEL].
1 7 3PILPEL, supra note 172.
'7, State instrumentalities have frequently been required to take affirmative
action to satisfy the requirements of equal protection. The reapportionment
cases required state legislatures to redistrict. E.g., Swan v. Adams, 383
U.S. 210 (1966); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966); Fortson v.
Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The
right to counsel cases require a state to provide defense attorneys for in-
digent defendants. E.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Griffin v. School Bd., 377 U.S. 218(1964), required taxes to be levied and schools to be re-opened. Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), required the state to provide indigent defen-
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not informing ward patients of their legal right to abortion in
certain instances and of providing this service with a far greater
availability to the more wealthy private patient would make out a
case of unconstitutional inequality.1'7 Clearly a hospital cannot,
through inaction or otherwise, fail to inform patients of the avail-
ability of drugs, helpful surgery, or any other available facilities
on the timid ground that a taboo surrounds the practice. Yet, at
least one observer has documented this very state of affairs in the
case of abortion, and the records of other hospitals are likely to
disclose similar unfairness. Lawrence Lader writes:
The most disastrous result of the abortion-committee system
has been economic and social discrimination against one group-
the ward patients. In large cities the poor, particularly Negroes
and Puerto Ricans, are virtually denied the same medical care as
the privileged few.
Of hospital abortions performed in New York City during
1960-62 only 7 per cent were non-whites, as compared with 93
per cent whites.
In this same period, 16 ward patients in municipal hospitals,
66 in voluntary hospitals were granted abortions, compared with
792 private patients. Under pressure of the German measles epi-
demic in 1964, ward patients received a little better share of abor-
tions: 32 in municipal, 64 in voluntary hospitals, as against 483
private patients.176
A discriminatory effect was also apparent in the limited administra-
tion of the Connecticut birth control statute invalidated in Griswold.
Although a majority of the Court went off on a different ground,
Justice White took judicial notice of the plain fact of discrimination
in his concurring opinion. He wrote:
[A]nd the clear effect of these statutes, as enforced, is to deny
disadvantaged citizens ... those without either adequate knowl-
edge or resources to obtain private counseling, access to medical
assistance and up-to-date information .... 177
dants with a free transcript on appeal; cf. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305
(1966) (cost of transcript cannot be taken from prisoner's wages).
"A survey in 1966 of hospitals in New York state established that 3.7
more abortions per delivery were performed at proprietary hospitals than
public hospitals. Hall, Present Abortion Practices in Hospitals of New York
State, 23 N.Y. MED. 124 (1967).
" LADER 29.
217 381 U.S. at 503.
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B. State Residence Requirements
To date only North Carolina has enacted an abortion reform
law for the sole benefit of its residents.'7" The apparent purpose of
such a provision is to preserve the state's reputation from the criti-
cism that it is an "abortion mecca" for non-residents. No state,
however, has general laws forbidding its physicians to treat non-
residents under any other circumstances. No state prohibits phy-
sicians from prescribing contraceptives for non-residents. No state
has a code of human rights applicable only to residents. No state
has abolished capital punishment for the sake of convicted residents
only. No state forbids its universities to enroll non-residents." In
general, states treat non-residents within their borders the same as
they do residents; states have not tended to "wall" themselves off.
The actual language of the fourteenth amendment seems to forbid
such discrimination. It demands that a state accord equal protection
of its laws to all persons "within its jurisdiction,"' 80 and not just
to "residents." Supreme Court decisions support the view that one's
residence is not generally a relevant factor in determining which
laws apply to him, and that the rights to travel and be accorded the
same protection of the laws as accorded a resident are fundamental
rights."8 Minor state regulations, however, which protect a valid
local interest are permissible, 82 but the state must establish a sub-
stantial basis for legislation which discriminates against the funda-
mental interests of a non-resident. A typical case would be thaf of
a private physician who operates in a private clinic or hospital and
is otherwise able to treat any patient he accepts regardless of resi-
178 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1967). See also Colorado Medical
Soc'y, Abortion Guidelines 8 (1967) ("voluntary" refusal to treat non-resi-
dents suggested). Quaere the validity of a state law discriminating against
residents?
"" A state university presumably may impose non-resident tuition to
offset the tax burden, but it must not be "unduly rigid" in interpreting its
requirements for establishing residence. Clark v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp.
117 (S.D. Iowa 1966).18 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV.
1"E.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966): "[F]reedom
to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic
right under the Constitution." Accord, Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160(1941) (based on commerce clause).18
' See, e.g., Schreiber v. City of Rye, - Misc. 2d -, 278 N.Y.S.2d
527 (Westch, Cty. Ct. 1967) (municipality upheld in its refusal to permit
non-residents to use local golf and swimming facilities; the court rested its
conclusion on the town's stated desire to reduce overcrowding in recreation
areas).
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dence. State intervention would be against the will of both physician
and patient and would rest solely on the fact that the patient came
across state lines to seek the best medical treatment available. This
form of legislation is admittedly discriminatory in the face of the
fundamental interest of the patient to seek treatment and the phy-
sician to administer it. It is worth noting that the four month
residence requirement imposed in North Carolina 83 might as well
be ten years since abortion after three months is not medically de-
sirable except in emergency cases.
The elimination of discriminatory administration of present
abortion laws, however, affords only impartial relief or none at all
for other interests and classifications. Differences which claim to
warrant no distinctions are present. The woman whose health would
be impaired without danger to her life by continued pregnancy can
see little justification for a law which differentiates between her and
other women who are presently protected. Similarly, the woman
who has failed or been unable to exercise her fundamental right to
contraception could argue with justification that shortly after con-
ception she ought not to lose that authority over her reproductive
organs which the woman who has successfully used contraceptives
still retains.
D. lnstitutional Considerations
The advisability from any number of perspectives of encouraging
the judiciary to protect the fundamental interests of individual citi-
zens from unduly restrictive state action is an insoluble question of
too great a complexity to be re-mooted in this Article."8 4 To invali-
date a state's abortion prohibitions may be viewed as either "pas-
sive" decision-making or raw "activism," depending upon one's view
"" See note 178 supra.
... Discussion pertaining to the role of courts in protecting individual
liberty has centered on free expression cases and the first amendment. For
the "passivist" view see generally L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958);
R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERN-
MENT (1955); Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARv. L. REV.
40 (1961); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,
73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959).
Commentary advocating a more "active" judicial role includes C. BLACK,
THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960); MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM
(1965); Cahn, The Firstuess of the First Amendment, 65 YALE L.J. 464
(1956); McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 1182
(1959); Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 H~Av.
L. REV. 193 (1952).
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of the judicial function in American government and the persuasive-
ness of the constitutional case made out against the state action at
issue. To the abortion reformers, a strong judicial posture in this
area would strengthen human dignity and individual liberty. It
could permit greater personal choice by individual women and their
physicians in fundamental areas of family planning and alleviate
much of the tragedy of criminal abortion. Abortion reform oppon-
ents, on the other hand, consider the 1,000,000 annual terminations
of pregnancy as 1,000,000 homicides and would prefer that the
number not be increased. It is difficult to pinpoint precisely what
interest could oppose abortion reform other than the impermissible
interest in enforcing the view that abortion is the intentional killing
of a "human being," but prescribing a lesser penalty because of the
widespread refusal to hold such a belief.
While legislative policy-making may be more adept at enumerat-
ing those specific instances in which a majority of legislators could
be persuaded to accept legal abortion, this fact is inapposite. The
Supreme Court has settled that family planning by contraception is
not subject to community acquiescence or approval by vote at the
town-meeting or by the state's elected law-makers. Abortion, from
the standpoint of the family, raises issues too similar to those raised
by contraception for a court to permit them to be put to a vote in
each community. The judiciary can examine the sociological phe-
nomenon of abortion in the quiet of stately chambers, as a complex
of issues to be resolved within constitutional guidelines. A legislator
must fend off organized opposition and charges of "murder" in the
hurried course of the legislative process, uncertain of political climate
and possibly possessing the single certainty that public lack of aware-
ness as to the existence and seriousness of the abortion problem
could ensure defeat at the next election for those who exercise an
informed and sincere best judgment. A court, however, can provide
a reasoned hearing for both sides.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
If the analysis offered in this article is sound, the federal con-
stitution may provide considerable immunity for the American
woman and her physician when they choose to terminate a preg-
nancy by therapeutic abortion. A woman's right to control her own
reproductive organs is of fundamental importance to her. It is not
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a right to be lightly yielded to the elected representatives of the local
community. Yet the states wield coercive power over the pregnant
woman from the moment she conceives-requiring that she gave
birth without regard for her personal belief as to the morality of
abortion. The toll of prohibitions against abortion has been great-
in suffering, frustration, and not infrequently death. Respect for
the legal system is not enhanced by the flagrant violation of strict
abortion statutes nor by the discriminatory application of their silent
exceptions. A new wave of abortion reform has begun to make head-
way, gradually carving out legislative exceptions to the general
ascetic prohibition against the exercise of individual judgment. Yet
a frontal attack on the very assumptions of abortion legislation can
be made through judicial enforcement of the guarantees of human
rights found in the amendments to the United States Constitution.
Ultimately present abortion laws rest upon an asserted state interest
in protecting the fetus after fertilization. Although some opponents
of abortion reform equate the fetus in every way with a fully-de-
veloped infant, this view has prevailed in opposition circles for less
than one hundred years. Abortion before "quickening" was a com-
mon law right, as it is a statutory right in many countries in the
world less inclined to accept governmental ordering of private
marital autonomy. This belief in the value of protecting a fetus
under the rubric of "contingent life" attempts to bestow on the
fetus an identity it has not acquired, and this is done at the expense
of the adult woman's interests in her physical and mental health,
her physical autonomy, and marital privacy.
The state interest in regulating abortion is a subjective judg-
ment of value based upon a belief of religious character, a belief
which enacts one particular concept of "morality." It would permit
a state to outlaw use of any abortifacient tablet which might be de-
veloped to terminate pregnancy immediately after conception, and
would permit the outlawing of all abortion even though the woman's
life be placed in eminent peril if she is forced to bear the child.
Finally, present statutes are not only unreasonably restrictive but
exceedingly vague. They contravene the standards of sound medical
judgment and cause a haphazard, capricious treatment of requests
for the termination of pregnancies.
The position of this article, therefore, is that the assumptions
underlying state abortion restrictions fall outside the permissible
19681
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
scope of state action; that abortion prohibitions violate substantive
due process in contravention of values expressed in the Bill of
Rights as recognized by decisions of the Supreme Court; and that
the recent Griswold case voiding state anti-contraception legislation
could be invoked by individual physicians or members of hospital
abortion committees to invalidate abortion prohibitions as uncon-
stitutional assertions of state power.*
* Anthor's Note: As this article went to press, several noteworthy events
occurred, which should be mentioned to bring the background of the article
up to date. Maryland and Georgia have passed abortion laws which make
reforms along the lines suggested by the American Law Institute. MD. ANN.
CODE art. 43, §§ 145, 149(E)-(G) (Supp. 1967), as amended, House Bill
No. 88 (1968); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-11 (1953), as amended, House Bill No.
281 (1968). The Georgia act is discussed in 159 N.Y.L.J. No. 40, at 1 (Feb.
28, 1968). The American Civil Liberties Union completed its study of
abortion laws and concluded that the laws of every state deprived "women
of the liberty to decide whether and when their bodies are to be used for
procreation . . . ." N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1968, at 35, col. 1 (city ed.).
The ACLU took the position that the decision to terminate a pregnancy
should rest solely with the woman and her physician. The proceedings on an
international conference on abortion held on September 6-8, 1967, sponsored
by the Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr., Foundation and the Harvard Divinity School,
have recently been published in THE TERRIBLE CHOICE (1968). A second
international conference is planned by the Association for the Study of
Abortion for November 17-20, 1968. The United States Supreme Court
recently noted probable jurisdiction in a case in which the lower court held
that a one-year welfare residence requirement violates the Constitution.
Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967), prob. juris. noted,
88 S. Ct. 784 (Jan. 15, 1968) (No. 813). The outcome of this case will have
an important bearing upon state residency requirements for legal abortions,
since both requirements are motivated by state desire to exclude non-residents
from a public benefit.
[Vol. 46
